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3Act LVIII of 2001 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, which entered into effect on 13 July 2001, defines the
primary objective of Hungary’s central bank as the achievement and maintenance of price stability. Low
inflation allows the economy to function more effectively, contributes to better economic growth over
time and helps to moderate cyclical fluctuations in output and employment.
Using an inflation targeting system, the Bank seeks to attain price stability by implementing a gradual,
but firm disinflation programme over the course of several years. The Monetary Council, the supreme
decision-making body of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, performs a comprehensive review of the expected
development of inflation every three months, in order to establish the monetary conditions that are con-
sistent with achieving the inflation target. The Council’s decision is the result of careful consideration of
a wide range of factors, including an assessment of prospective economic developments, the inflation
outlook, money and capital market trends and risks to stability.
In order to provide the public with a clear insight into the operation of monetary policy and enhance
transparency, the Bank publishes the information available at the time of making its monetary policy
decisions. The Quarterly Report on Inflation presents the forecasts prepared by the Economics
Department for inflation, as well as the macroeconomic developments underlying the forecast. The fore-
casts of the Economics Department are based on certain assumptions. Hence, in producing its fore-
cast, the Economics Department assumes an unchanged monetary and fiscal policy. In respect of eco-
nomic variables exogenous to monetary policy, the forecasting rules used in previous issues of the
Report are applied.
The analyses in this Report were prepared by the Economics Department staff under the general direction of Ág-
nes CSERMELY, Head of Department. The project was managed by Barnabás FERENCZI, Deputy Head of the
Economics Department, together with Attila CSAJBÓK, Head of the Monetary Assessment and Strategy Division,
Balázs VONNÁK, Deputy Head of the Monetary Assessment and Strategy Division, Mihály András KOVÁCS,
Deputy Head of the Conjunctural Assessment and Projections Division, and Zoltán M. JAKAB, Head of the Model
Development Unit. The Report was approved for publication by István HAMECZ, Managing Director.
Primary contributors to this Report also include Judit ANTAL, Péter BENCZÚR, Zoltán GYENES, Cecilia HORNOK,
Zoltán M. JAKAB, Péter KARÁDI, Gergely KISS, Mihály András KOVÁCS, Zsolt LOVAS, András OSZLAY, Gábor
PULA, András REZESSY, Róbert SZEMERE, Barnabás VIRÁG, and Zoltán WOLF. Other contributors to the analy-
ses and forecasts in this Report include various staff members of the Economics Department and the Monetary
Instruments and Markets Department, Statistics Department. Translated by Sándor FAZEKAS, Éva LI, Edit
MISKOLCZY, Péter SZÛCS and Éva TAMÁSI.
The Report incorporates valuable input from the MNB’s other departments as well as the Monetary Council’s com-
ments and suggestions following its meetings on 2 May and 23 May 2005. However, the projections and policy con-
siderations reflect the views of the Economics Department staff and do not necessarily reflect those of the Monetary
Council or the MNB.
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7Overview  
Recent macroeconomic developments have confirmed the
assessment presented in the February Report, according to which
disinflation could persist, if the interest rate and exchange rate
assumptions in the forecast are met. An important contributing fac-
tor in this respect is that, over the period ahead, growth in unit
labour costs in the corporate sector is expected to be significant-
ly slower than earlier. In addition, lower household consumption
growth relative to the previous years and increasing market com-
petition are also likely to support a decline in inflation. All of these
factors point to longer-term inflation between 3–3.5 per cent.
The rapid fall in inflation, which characterised 2004 H2, continued
in 2005 Q1. In addition to the base effects engendered by tax
increases last year, trend inflation indicators also kept slowing
strongly. Confirming our expectations, March and April data
marked the beginning of a period of more moderate disinflation,
after the dramatic decline in inflation which started towards end-
2004.
In 2004, the fall in inflation was reflected mainly in tradables
prices. By contrast, 2005 Q1 data suggest that disinflation also
affected product groups covered by the core measure of infla-
tion. Most recent data reveal that inflation in the services sector
has reached a historically low level, and disinflation has also
continued to affect tradables. After adjusting for seasonal varia-
tion, inflation in the tradables and processed food sectors fell in
2005 Q1.
Significant inflationary pressure, caused by labour market trends,
started to ease gradually in 2004 H2. Available data show that the
labour market has begun to adjust to a low inflation environment.
Accordingly, a significant slowdown is discernible in the rate of
wage growth. This has been induced by firms’ subdued labour
demand, which was prompted by a downturn in the business
cycle in Hungary and abroad as well as by high labour costs.
Meanwhile, in a downward correction to the expansion of previ-
ous periods, employment levels in the public sector have started
falling. Simultaneous declines in corporate and government sec-
tor labour demand have resulted in a pick-up in unemployment,
which is likely to further ease wage growth pressure.
Low inflation environment 
expected to persist
Rapid disinflation continued in
early 2005
Declining inflation now affects the
prices of a wide array of goods
and services
Slowing wage growth and 
increasing labour market reserves
contribute to disinflation
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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Consistent with earlier practice, our projection is conditional on
several assumptions simultaneously. In this regard, special atten-
tion must be paid to the assumption of unchanged interest rates
and exchange rates at April levels over the entire forecast period.
More specifically, our projection reflects future macroeconomic
developments anticipated against a background of a central bank
base rate of 7.5 per cent, a long-term interest rate of approxi-
mately 7 per cent and an exchange rate of EUR/HUF 248. Another
major assumption is that, based on futures quotes, oil prices will
decline gradually from their high level in April and remain slightly
above USD 50 over the forecast period.
Currently, there are several of factors of uncertainty potentially
influencing the expected future path of inflation outlined above.
Here, the persistence of stronger market competition, i.e. the
question of the degree to which the disinflation impact of sharper
competition will make itself felt and how long it will last, is of spe-
cial importance. The extent to which the current rise in unemploy-
ment will relieve pressures caused by wage growth is also a fac-
tor of significant uncertainty, as no similar labour market situation
has ever occurred during the period forming the basis of our
analyses. Any further increase in oil prices would likely boost infla-
tion, as would any future fiscal policy that is looser than assumed
in terms of its impact on demand. However, inflation may also be
lower than projected, due to a downturn in foreign demand relative
to the main scenario.
Allowing for the above risks and assuming that the interest rates
and exchange rates remain unchanged at April levels, our forecast
is for inflation to most likely remain within the 3.5 ± 1 per cent tar-
get range at end-2006, with a 30 per cent likelihood that inflation
will be below the target range and an approximately 20 per cent
likelihood that it will be above it.
Economic growth may slow down slightly, following the pick-up in
2004. Based on data adjusted for calendar effects, after last year’s
3.8 per cent growth it will stabilise at around 3.5 per cent over the
forecast horizon, consistent with a slower increase in external
demand and steady growth in domestic absorption. Fixed capital
formation is likely to be less robust than last year, and household
consumption, which reached unsustainable proportions in earlier
years, is likely to continue to adjust downwards. This is expected
to result in slower import growth, leading to a positive net export
If the interest rate and exchange
rate conditions prevailing in April
remain unchanged, inflation will,
most likely remain within the 
target range
The rate of economic growth will
stabilise around 3.5 per cent
Our projection is based on the
assumption that the interest rate
and exchange rate that prevailed
in April remains unchanged
Overview  
9
contribution to GDP growth, despite the restraining effect of the
global business cycle on exports.
Hungary’s GDP-proportionate external financing requirement may
fall by 0.5 percentage points in 2005. The GDP-proportionate bor-
rowing requirement of general government, including quasi-fiscal
activities, is expected to remain broadly unchanged. With the slug-
gish expansion of capital expenditure, the GDP-proportionate net
financing requirement of the corporate sector is unlikely to grow
further, while, against a backdrop of lacklustre household fixed
investment activity and subdued consumption, households’ net
financial savings may increase slightly. Although the external
financing requirement is expected to improve perceptibly, the cur-
rent account deficit is likely to decline only slightly for reasons of
methodology applied to the settlement of EU transfers.
In 2006, the precondition for a decline in the external financing
requirement is a restrictive fiscal policy on the level of the entire
general government, while the GDP-proportionate financing
capacity of the private sector is expected to remain unchanged.
Due to greater uncertainty, a projection for fiscal trends in accor-
dance with ESA-95 is difficult to provide. The main explanation for
this is that, in total, items that have not yet been classified accord-
ing to the Eurostat methodology may amount to 0.5-1 per cent of
GDP. As for this reason no reliable estimate of the deficit on the
ESA-95 basis can be provided, our assessment is based on the
methodologically more reliable cash (GFS) and national accounts
(or SNA) indicators.
In 2006, perceptible improvement
in the external equilibrium will
require a decline in general 
government borrowing
The inflation fan chart
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The budget deficit target is
unlikely to be met in 2005 unless
further measures are taken
Turnaround in global capital
market trends 
Declining short-term yields, but
considerable long-term uncertain-
ty persists
The current projection is based on the assumption that non-open-
ended expenditure appropriations will materialise in 2005 and the
freezing of reserves will be effective. Even if these assumptions mate-
rialise, the budget deficit target will only be met in 2005 if further gov-
ernment measures are taken. The reason for this is that, in our view,
tax revenues will prove lower than planned. It should also be borne
in mind that the risk of excess expenditure is also significant.
In preparing our central projection, we continued to assume a 0.6
per cent reduction in the budget deficit as provided for in the
Government’s convergence programme. However, our calcula-
tions indicate that without further measures the ESA deficit would
rise significantly in 2006.
March saw a change in global risk assessment which had been
improving for almost a year. Although the global financial climate
is still benign, uncertainty has increased in financial markets. The
changes in foreign investors’ risk appetite affected the entire CEE
region, which was reflected in similar developments in the region-
al exchange rates and government securities prices.
The forint exchange rate appreciated in the period to mid-March,
before weakening to last year’s average. Improving prospects for
inflation led to a rapid fall in short-term forint yields; however, in
contrast with other countries in the region, the longer end of the
HUF yield curve was hardly affected by rising demand. This sug-
gests that foreign investors’ assessment of the Hungarian econo-
my’s equilibrium position and convergence prospects remains
less favourable.
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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A reduction in the deficit planned
for 2006 is only feasible through
major adjustments
11
2003 2004 2005 2006
Actual/Estimate Projection
Consumer price index
December 5.7 5.5 3.3 3.2
Annual average 4.7 6.8 3.3 3.4
Economic growth
External demand (GDP-based) 0.5 1.8 1.5 2.2
Household consumption 7.6 2.8 2.1 2.8
Gross fixed capital formation 3.4 8.3 4.5 5.2
Public consumption 5.4 -2.1 2.5 1.0
Domestic absorption 5.4 3.3 3.1 3.4
Exports 7.6 15.7 8.5 9.6
Imports 10.4 14.0 7.7 9.0
GDP 3.0 3.8 (4.0)* 3.5 (3.3)* 3.6
Current account deficit
As a percentage of GDP 8.7 8.9 8.6 8.2
EUR billions 6.4 7.1 7.5 7.6
External financing requirement
As a percentage of GDP 8.7 8.5 8.0 7.4
General government
Cash (GFS) deficit 5.9 6.5 5.6 n/a
ESA deficit 7.2 5.4-6.0** 5.0-5.8** 4.4-5.2***
Deficit according to the national definition
1
6.2 4.5-5.1** 3.9-4.7** n/a
Augmented (SNA) deficit
2
8.5 8.1 8.5 n/a
Demand impact
3
-0.4 -0.3 0.1 n/a
Labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings
4
10.9 6.1 8.4 6.3
Whole-economy employment
5
1.2 -0.5 -0.5 0.5
Private sector gross average earnings 8.7 9.3 7.0 6.6
Private sector employment
5
0.7 -0.3 -0.1 0.8
Private sector ULC 6.5 3.1 2.9 1.8
Household real income 5.3 4.0 3.4 2.7
Summary table of the main scenario
(Projections are conditional, with the main scenario reflecting the most probable scenario that applies
only if all of the assumptions presented in Section 3 materialise; unless otherwise specified, percent-
age changes on a year earlier.)
Our projection is based on data with a cut-off time of 17 May 2005. For details on changes in our forecasts relative to the February issue of the Report or a com-
parison with other forecasts, see Section 4.1. 
1
Correction of ESA deficit with payments into and from private pension funds. 
2
Cash deficit of the general government
excluding certain extraordinary revenue and expenditure, and including quasi-fiscal activities recorded outside the general government. 
3
Calculated from the so-
called augmented (SNA) type indicator; a negative value denotes narrowing of aggregate demand. 
4
13th-month salaries carried over from 2004 to January 2005 in
the public sector cause a downward bias of the 2004 wage growth indicator and an upward bias of that in 2005. 
5
Consistent with the CSO labour force survey.
* In 2004, the leap-year effect may have caused an upward distortion in GDP of some 0.2 percentage points, i.e. instead of the 4.0 per cent headline GDP-
growth the underlying figure adjusted for calendar effects was probably around 3.8 per cent. In 2005 the distortion  is in the negative direction. Our 3.5
per cent growth projection is consistent with the underlying 3.8 per cent growth estimated for 2004. ** The range indicates the uncertainty in the appli-
cation of the ESA methodology in Hungary *** Assumption, based on the 0.6 per cent deficit reduction target in the Convergence Programme of the
Government, relative to our 2005 projection.
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In the case of small open economies, such as Hun-
gary, which allow for the possibility of free capital
flows, the relevance of international trends to
domestic financial markets is outstanding. Yields on
major international markets and global risk appetite,
which influences the risk premium expected on
Hungarian financial assets, combine to constitute
the starting point of an analysis of the domestic
financial market.
Since early 2005, global capital market trends have
affected the risk assessment of forint assets more
than previously, with country-specific factors playing
a less influential role. Historically speaking, global
risk appetite is still high. Nevertheless, the extreme-
ly benign climate which characterised 2004 H2 has
changed over the past few months, and uncertainty
has been rising in global markets since mid-March.
It was primarily news and fresh data on the US econ-
omy’s business cycle and the equilibrium position
that influenced global risk appetite by way of expec-
tations for the interest and exchange rate of the US
dollar. The tightening cycle which began last June
continued. Maintaining its measured pace of 25
basis point rate raises, the Federal Reserve
increased its policy rate to 3% in two steps in March
and May. Despite the predictability of the Federal
Reserve’s steps, uncertainty surrounding the path of
official interest rates increased, mostly due to
changes in the assessment of the anticipated busi-
ness cycle and inflation, which in turn was related to
oil prices to a great degree. 
Given the process of convergence leading to the
introduction of the euro, euro yields play a dominant
role in the Hungarian government securities market.
The ECB’s key rate has remained unchanged for
nearly two years now and is currently 100 basis
points lower than the Federal funds rate as a result
of the Federal Reserve’s steady rate increases. The
underlying reason that the ECB’s key rate has
remained unchanged and that expectations of rate
increases have been postponed until 2006 Q1 is the
deteriorating outlook for the real economy. Risks to
inflation have also declined in line with this develop-
ment. Notwithstanding high oil prices, inflation has
not increased over the past few months and is likely
to remain around the 2% target set by the ECB for
the rest of the year.
These developments are also reflected in long-term
yields. Although, overall, rate increases in the US
have translated into a 200-basis point tightening at
the short end of the yield curve, the Fed found long-
term US dollar yields unreasonably low in early
February. Compared to early February, 10-year
yields had risen by approximately 60 basis points by
mid-March, when they began to fall again. In
essence, differences in longer-term business cycle
perspectives are reflected in the fact that, while
long-term euro and dollar yields have generally
moved in parallel, the gap between long-term yields,
which opened up in the previous quarter, has per-
sisted. This affects the assessment of long-term fo-
rint yields and the interest differential that investors
take into consideration.
1. 1 Foreign interest rates and risk assessment
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Federal Reserve and ECB key rates
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The 12-month average yield on 10-year Hungarian
government securities has been declining since
autumn 2004. Nevertheless, in March 2005 it was
still 170 basis points higher than the Maastricht in-
terest rate criterion, which stood at 6.1%. The gap
between yields on 10-year government securities
and the interest rate criterion has not narrowed to
the same extent as forint yields have fallen, due to
the fact that yields have also declined in EU
Member States recently.
By historical standards, global risk assessment
remained extremely favourable until mid-March.
Risk indicators, which had been declining for a
period of almost one year, continued to fall.
Capital flows into emerging markets were vigor-
ous during this period. Mid-March was a turning
point, however, as risk indicators reflecting trends
in fixed investment market and the stock
exchange rose sharply in a short time. The higher
volatility in risk indicators observed in recent
weeks is attributable, in large part, to growing
uncertainty over the assessment of US macroeco-
nomic trends.
Global trends also influenced risk assessment
significantly in Hungary’s closer regional context.
As global developments were dominant, co-
movement between the Czech, Polish, Slovak and
Hungarian markets became stronger, which was
also reflected in interest and exchange rate
developments. It is, however, important to stress
that in recent months macroeconomic trends
have been more favourable in other countries of
the region than in Hungary, and the increase in
risk appetite was consistent with equilibrium indi-
cators and the improving prospects for such indi-
cators in these countries.
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10-year government bond yields
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Long-term government yields and the interest rate 
criterion
* VIX – Implied volatility derived from options for the S&P500 share index.
** EMBI Global Composite – interest premium index of sovereign and
quasi-sovereign issuers’ US dollar-denominated bonds, as calculated by
J.P. Morgan-Chase.
*** MAGGIE – the index (bp) of euro-denominated government, corporate
and mortgage bonds as calculated by J.P. Morgan-Chase.
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Inflation expectations for this year have fallen
throughout the region, and, except in Hungary,
last year’s general government deficit did not
exceed the level set in the convergence pro-
gramme in any of these countries. In the Czech
Republic, for example, despite the unstable
domestic political situation, GDP-proportionate
general government deficit was nearly 1 percent-
age point lower than expected. The current
account deficit in these three countries was also
significantly lower in 2004 than in Hungary. In the
coming years, sustained growth in the deficit is
only expected to occur in Poland, where its current
level is low, amounting to 1.5% of GDP.
In the case of Hungary, as the currently close
regional correlation might weaken, risk assess-
ment may again depend to a larger extent on
domestic fundamentals, which carry significantly
higher risks than those in the other countries in the
region. Thus, waning global risk appetite may
result in a more significant adjustment in Hungary
than in the region as a whole.
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Changes in the exchange rates of the currencies in the
region against the euro since 2 January 2005
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1. 2 Exchange rate and yield developments
Trends in domestic financial markets have been
determined by changes in the global risk appetite
and the faster-than-expected fall in inflation since
January 2005. Changes in foreign investors’ will-
ingness to take risks have affected the entire reg-
ion and been reflected in similar movements of
exchange rates and government bond yields.
However, while the improving inflation outlook has
led to a rapid reduction in short-term forint yields,
increasing demand has affected the longer end of
the yield curve less strongly, suggesting that for-
eign investors’ assessment of the convergence
outlook for the Hungarian economy continues to
be unfavourable relative to that of the other coun-
tries in the region.
In terms of exchange rate and yields develop-
ments, the period since January 2005 can be
divided into two distinctly separate phases: from
mid-January to mid-March and from mid-March to
the present. The first phase was characterised by
favourable investor sentiment and rising risk
appetite. Consistent with this, the forint clearly fol-
lowed a path of appreciation. The rise in non-resi-
dent demand for forint-denominated assets was
clearly reflected by the increase in the volume of
the government securities portfolio held by non-
residents. The unchanged stock of swap contracts
against a backdrop of a larger volume of govern-
ment securities suggests that non-resident
investors did not hedge the HUF exchange rate
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Benchmark yields in the government securities market
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Government securities and net outstanding swaps held
by non-resident investors*
* The decline in April 2005 was attributable to fact that a large amount
matured at that time.
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risk posed by their government bond position, i.e.
on the whole, they increased their HUF exchange
rate exposure.
During the same period the yield curve flattened
out, i.e. short-term yields fell significantly, while
long-term ones declined only slightly. In keeping
with this, the implied forward curve sloped down at
5 years’ maturity and had practically flattened out
by early March. The fact that the yield curve is less
inverse indicates that conflicting trends affected
investors’ behaviour and expectations at various
horizons before mid-March. 
Short-term benchmark yields on government
securities were approximately 150 basis points
lower in mid-March than in early January. During
the same period the key policy rate was also low-
ered by a total of 125 basis points. The fact that
no material changes occurred in short-term
benchmark yields at the time of the rate cuts sug-
gests that market participants had already priced
in these steps by the central bank. Therefore, the
steep fall in yields was attributable to a faster-
than-expected decrease in inflation rather than a
change in the assessment of monetary policy.
Inflation in both January and February was 0.5
percentage points lower than Reuters analysts’
consensus forecast, which is considered to be a
good approximation of expectations. Accor-
dingly, there was a downward shift in the expect-
ed path of the key policy rate relative to January.
Global investor sentiment that had boosted forint
demand changed in mid-March, triggering an
increase in risk premia on riskier assets. This
increased risk aversion was reflected in both the
depreciation of the exchange rate of the forint and
a decline in the government securities position
taken by non-resident investors. Changing
investor sentiment manifested also itself in the
upward co-movement of short-term and long-term
yields during this period. As market sentiment
became more uncertain and the exchange rate of
the forint weakened, the anticipated path of the
policy rate moved upwards.
Exchange rate and yield movements can also be
ascribed to shifts in market participants’ exchange
rate expectations. Whether or not this is the case
can be checked against the Reuters survey of
macro analysts. The April survey reveals hardly
any change in macro analysts’ expectations, rela-
tive to January. Compared to the exchange rate
prevailing at the time of the survey, market partic-
ipants only anticipate slight weakening until end-
2005, amounting to a couple of forints. Based on
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Implied forward yields at various points in time
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from the forward yield curve
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
20
the expectations, the exchange rate will remain
unchanged in 2006. All this points to the fact that,
considering the period under review as a whole,
the exchange rate of the forint and yields were
influenced primarily by risk premia, rather than
exchange rate expectations.
Relative to short-term yields, long-term yields
changed less markedly during the period as a
whole. As euro yields have a significant influence
on forint yields, a more reliable picture of the
assessment of long-term convergence can be
obtained if their impact is excluded. Develop-
ments in implied 5-year forward rate differentials 5
years ahead indicate that, although changes in
risk appetite affected the CEECs similarly, the
long-term assessment of the economic fundamen-
tals of the individual countries varies considerably.
The long-term HUF forward rate differential has
been fluctuating within a narrow band for over a
year now, while premia on the Polish zloty and the
Czech koruna relative to the euro have been
declining since the early autumn of 2004. This gap
suggests that, in contrast to neighbouring coun-
tries, investors’ assessment of Hungary’s conver-
gence outlook has not improved. The Reuters sur-
vey also reflects unchanged expectations for the
country’s entry into the euro area. Over the past 12
months, macro analysts continued to deem 2010
as the most likely date for the introduction of the
euro in Hungary.
—0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
—0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Forint
Zloty
Ja
n.
 0
4
F
eb
. 0
4
M
ar
. 0
4
A
pr
. 0
4
M
ay
 0
4
Ju
ne
 0
4
Ju
ly
 0
4
A
ug
. 0
4
S
ep
. 0
4
O
ct
. 0
4
N
ov
. 0
4
D
ec
. 0
4
Ja
n.
 0
5
F
eb
. 0
5
M
ar
. 0
5
A
pr
. 0
5
Per cent Per cent
Czech Crown
Chart 1.11
5-year implied forward rate differentials 5 years ahead
21
Monetary policy exerts its impact on the real econ-
omy mainly through real exchange rates and real
interest rates. Due to the key importance of foreign
trade in Hungary, the role of the exchange rate is
the more important channel. The following pro-
vides a brief outline of recent changes in these two
indicators, and of market participants’ view of
future developments in such. In providing an
approximation of market expectations, we rely on
the Reuters survey, which – although it is not a
representative sample of all economic participants
– presumably provides a good approximation of
trends.
Real exchange rate
The real effective exchange rate calculated with
the CPI appreciated by approximately 3 per cent
between January and April. This real appreciation
was attributable to a rise in price level that was
faster than abroad, which is a customary phenom-
enon early on in the year. No significant change
occurred in the nominal effective exchange rate
during the period under review.
The real exchange rate path, calculated on the
basis of market participants’ expectations for the
nominal exchange rate and inflation, however, no
longer suggests any further real appreciation
before end-2006. The extent of the depreciation of
the nominal exchange rate, expected to materi-
alise before end-2006, somewhat exceeds the
anticipated inflation differential, which points to
slight real depreciation.
Real interest rates
Unlike the real exchange rate, the real interest rate
one year ahead, which is crucial to monetary poli-
cy decisions, has eased over the past few months.
Its current 3-4 per cent level can be considered as
1. 3 Monetary conditions
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Monetary conditions: the CPI-based real exchange rate*
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Monetary conditions: the real interest rate*
* Monthly averages of one-year government securities yields deflated by the
current 12-month inflation and Reuters’ one-year ex ante inflation consen-
sus (year-end values, derived from expectations for average inflation by
using interpolations). Expectations for December 2006 were calculated
using Reuters analysts’ consensus on inflation and one-year yields.
* Real effective exchange rate: year-2000 average = 100 per cent. Higher
values denote real appreciation. Our estimates of expectations for end-
2005 were based on a Reuters analysts’ consensus on inflation and the
exchange rate. We assumed that, relative to a year-on-year average, infla-
tion in trading partner countries would not change and that expectations
for the appreciation of the effective exchange rate would be identical to
those for the appreciation of the forint vis-à-vis the euro.
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average over a longer period. This decline is still
attributable to the fall in nominal interest rates.
Analyst expectations in April suggest that forward-
looking real interest rates may decrease slightly
prior to end-2005, since analysts project a smaller
decrease in inflation than in yields.
A rise in the contemporaneous real interest rate in
January and February was ascribable to a rapid
fall in inflation. By end-Q1, however, it had
returned to the 3%–4% range, prevalent since
mid-2004. Thus, in essence, it is identical to the
forward-looking interest rate.
2 Inflation and its 
determining factors

25
2. 1 Economic activity
Developments at the end of 2004 present contra-
dictory signs regarding the future strength of
economic activity which accelerated in early
2004. Although the slowdown in external demand
is primarily attributed to uncertainties surround-
ing oil prices and thus most analysts expect it to
be temporary, foreign business sentiment indices
do not give reason to be optimistic about a
renewed fast recovery. As it is closely linked to
the foreign business cycle, domestic corporate
economic activity also slowed down significantly
at end-2004 and this carried over to early 2005
as well. Together with the long-standing decline
in household demand this suggests that the pace
of economic growth will continue to slow.
2. 1. 1 External demand
Looking at the whole of last year, both GDP and
imports by our most important foreign trading
partners grew at the fastest pace in the last four
years. GDP growth amounted to 1.8 per cent,
while imports expanded at a rate of 6.0 per cent
weighted with country shares in Hungarian
exports. Average economic growth in euro area
countries was around 2 per cent, in line with the
estimated figure generally accepted for the
potential economic growth of the euro area.
Therefore, 2004 was the first year when the exter-
nal business cycle showed clear signs of a
robust recovery, following the end of recession in
the world economy at end-2001.
The European business cycle, which is of key
importance for Hungary, however, was far from
even during last year. In H1, net exports, the main
engine driving the upturn, remained strong while
internal demand factors (household consumption
and fixed investment) continued to be weak. In
H2, net exports of the euro area fell significantly,
partly due to the growth in imports prompted by
massive stockbuilding and possibly to the effect
of the strong euro and high oil prices, and its
contribution to growth turned negative. This
effect was somewhat counterbalanced by more
dynamic growth in fixed investment from Q3 and
rising consumption from Q4. Despite this, howev-
er, the pace of GDP growth slowed down from
Q3. Due to the strengthening of uncertainties sur-
rounding oil and commodity prices, the rate of
foreign trade growth has decreased both global-
ly and in the euro area. Thus, although growth in
both GDP and the import-based external
demand was outstanding for the year as a whole,
this was accompanied by a slowdown in growth
in Q4.
The slowdown can be seen even more clearly in
the case of Germany, which constitutes more than
Chart 2.1 
Size of Hungary’s export markets* and GDP in its 
major foreign trade partner countries
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates)
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40 per cent of Hungary’ export markets, as GDP
stagnated in Q3 followed by a clear decrease in
Q4 with economic growth reaching a scant 1 per
cent in 2004. By year-end, German industrial out-
put and the momentum in goods exports and
imports tapered off and, in terms of data on eco-
nomic activity, a mild upswing was only
detectable in new orders. In light of this, the actu-
al data of 2005 Q1 seem surprisingly good: the
first estimate for German GDP growth stands at 1
per cent quarter-on-quarter. The general outlook,
however, remains mixed, since business confi-
dence indices (first and foremost the IFO busi-
ness climate index) indicate continued deteriora-
tion in corporate managers’ sentiment, and as this
deterioration is even greater with respect to
expectations than with respect to the current bu-
siness situation, German economic activity may
continue to be sluggish throughout 2005.
As far as Hungary’s total export market is con-
cerned the picture seems similar: based on prelim-
inary estimates, economic growth in the euro area
in 2005 Q1 reached 0.5 per cent. Deteriorating bu-
siness confidence, however, is prevalent in a num-
ber of euro area countries and thus the possibilities
of a new recovery are uncertain.
2. 1. 2 Output
With regard to output developments, last year the
Hungarian economy was characterised by an
unexpectedly robust expansion in agriculture,
dynamic growth in manufacturing and construc-
tion and a slower increase in services.
Manufacturing output, which is most sensitive to the
business cycle, clearly moved in line with external
demand. In 2004, the sector’s gross output grew by
9.5 per cent: thus, similarly to external demand, last
year’s growth was the highest yearly rate since the
global recession in 2001. Its dynamics within the
year were similar to those seen in the external busi-
ness cycle: output slowed down significantly in Q3
and although it accelerated again temporarily in Q4
(due to an upsurge in export sales), according to
monthly data available since early 2005 it has fallen
further. With new export orders remaining flat, no
new upward trend can be expected. In addition to
the development of the external business cycle the
robust deceleration of productivity in early 2004 has
also played an important role in the weakening eco-
nomic activity in manufacturing. This slowdown is
further confirmed by surveys on domestic business
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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activity, which clearly indicate a more unfavourable
outlook.
In terms of value added, last year’s growth in man-
ufacturing output fell somewhat behind that of
2003 (5.8 per cent as opposed to 6.4 per cent in
the preceding year) as there was a widening gap
between the data on gross output and value
added from Q2. The gap between the two types of
data on manufacturing output widens from time to
time, usually followed by a narrowing the next
year: based on past data, therefore, it is possible
that the massive slowdown in gross output in early
2005 will not be followed by a similar decline in
value added.
Market services were affected by two contrasting
developments in 2004: the pace of growth was
bolstered by the strong external business cycle,
but hampered by the slowdown in household con-
sumption. This is confirmed by the fact that the
growth rate for transport and telecommunications
services, which are more exposed to the impact of
external business activity, increased by nearly 2
percentage points relative to 2003, while the
growth rate for retail services, which is linked mo-
re so with the development of household con-
sumption, fell to a similar extent. It seems more
and more likely that the trend of a slower increase
in value added in market services started in 2003
is becoming more permanent.
Agriculture, which barely accounts for 5 per cent
of whole-economy GDP, grew by 36.3 per cent in
2004, recording a nearly 2 percentage point con-
tribution to economic growth last year. Although
this exceeds the usual pace of growth of agricul-
ture it is difficult to draw any conclusions at this
stage regarding the sustainable component of the
growth outlook, in part due to methodological
uncertainties
1
.
In 2004, construction grew by 7 per cent on gross
output basis, and by more than 5 per cent on a
value added basis, being generally characterised
by stable growth throughout the year. Moreover,
the first two months’ data on gross output by the
construction sector suggest further recovery. The
good economic activity in construction may be
attributed to acceleration in infrastructure devel-
opments (primarily to motorway construction) on
the one hand, and to continued vigorous home bu-
ilding (due to the high number of previously issued
housing permits) on the other hand, despite the
tightening measures on mortgage lending at end-
2003. Despite the favourable Q1 data, however,
continuation of the current upturn in construction
activity is uncertain since only a very small per-
centage of the whole year’s construction output is
realised in this period and thus the time series
describing the trends in economic activity may
well change.
Chart 2.4
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See more in Section 2.1.6.
2. 1. 3 Household consumption, 
savings and fixed investment
Following the exceptionally high growth rates in
2002-2003, household consumption slowed
down significantly in 2004 as had been expect-
ed. Growth for the year as a whole came to 3.5
per cent, on the heels of a 8.1 per cent rise in
2003.
Although last year’s household consumer demand
growth clearly slowed down relative to its earlier
level, it was nevertheless still higher than most
analysts expected. Lower expectations were due
to the fact that the real net wage bill remained flat
or even decreased slightly instead of increasing.
At the same time, households’ net financial sav-
ings increased by nearly 2 per cent of GDP and,
according to our estimates, households’ fixed
investment expenditures may also have grown
significantly, reaching a rate of more than 10 per
cent even in real terms. These pieces of informa-
tion are rather difficult to bring in line with the stag-
nation in net real wages
2
.
Nevertheless, based on the data above, we can
conclude that if households’ consumption and 
fixed investment expenditures grew simultaneous-
ly with households’ net savings, the increase in
households’ real income containing social trans-
fers in cash and other mixed income is likely to
have been higher than shown by net real wages.
As at the time of preparing this analysis we have
actual data on these other income sources going
back only as far as 2002 we must rely on esti-
mates. These suggest implicitly that last year – in
addition to the real growth of social transfers in
cash of slightly more than 3 per cent – the real
increase in other income must have also been
considerable
3
.
Looking at the intra-year pattern of household con-
sumption based on quarterly indices it can also be
seen that – despite the annual growth rate of 3.5
per cent – the overall trend clearly slowed down in
2003 and 2004, although there were significant
fluctuations. Moreover, the data available for early
2005 suggest a further slowdown in households’
consumption growth. Both consumer confidence
indices and retail trade and car sales figures avail-
able for early 2005, as well as the deceleration of
lending to households indicate flagging house-
hold consumption demand.
In respect of household investment, although the
number of new mortgage loans is decreasing, the
number of valid housing permits remains high. The
number of new completions still showed remarkable
growth in Budapest; there was, however, a marked
drop outside the capital. Households’ fixed invest-
ments are likely to have started to decline after Q1,
a development already foreseen as a result of the
tightening of housing subsidies at end-2003.
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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See Section 4.5 of the November 2004 Report for more details.
3
According to the information avaliable, the robust increase in other income - in addition to the favourable performance of securities markets in 2004 -
could have been caused by the fact that agricultural and other subsidies from the EU and the Hungarian Ministry of Finance were accounted for here.
Furthermore, last year's output of the sectors accounting for most mixed income (e.g. construction and agriculture) was also considerable.
Chart 2.5
Retail trade turnover and consumption expenditure
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2. 1. 4 Corporate investment and 
stockbuilding
In line with the external and domestic business
activity corporate investment
4
, was vigorous in 2004,
even though it was rather volatile within the year. The
fluctuation in investment activity was especially
strong at year-end: a third quarter with dynamic
growth was followed by a surprisingly sharp decline
in the fourth quarter.
Disregarding quarterly fluctuations, however, trend
growth of corporate investment started to flatten out
relatively quickly in 2004. All of this was in line with
our expectations as capacity utilisation started to
decline following Q1, falling by nearly 3 per cent rel-
ative to its value a year earlier. The decline in Q4,
however, and especially its magnitude was unex-
pected, primarily due to the fact that the investment
cycle in the euro area started to recover from 2004
H2 following a longer period.
With regard to the yearly growth rate of invest-
ments, economic activity in this area was most
brisk in manufacturing and the transport-telecom-
munications sectors (disregarding mining, which
has a very small weight), but the deceleration at
year-end was strong in both sectors as well. Busi-
ness activity surveys on manufacturing suggest
that the percentage of managers judging their
existing capacity as sufficient to fulfil possible
future orders is growing and thus in 2005 H1
investment in manufacturing is not expected to
rise strongly again, most likely having an effect at
the whole corporate level.
Based on inventories, the least we can assume is
that no further decline can be expected in manu-
facturing fixed investment. This is due to the fact
that by the end of Q4 manufacturing inventories
grew more markedly, while based on earlier
experience this could be partly attributable to
unfinished fixed investments to be activated in
early 2005. In line with the slowdown in con-
sumption, commercial stocks also started to
decline. Overall, inventory levels went up last
year.
Chart 2.6 
Number of newly built dwellings and dwelling permits 
(Quarter-on-quarter growth rates)*
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The breakdown of whole-economy investment by sectors is calculated by the MNB based on coefficients estimated from sectoral data on fixed
capital formation. As detailed data on annual fixed capital formation are available with a delay of nearly a year and a half, estimated sectoral data
may be revised even for two years retrospectively before publication.
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Chart 2.7 
Corporate investment and capacity utilisation*
* Three-quarter moving averages.
2. 1. 5 Foreign trade and 
competitiveness
In 2004, spurred in particular by the trend at year-
end, foreign trade data in national accounts out-
line a significant upturn in net exports, as imports
grew by 14.0 per cent against a 15.7 per cent rise
in exports last year. Net exports improved in pa-
rallel with deteriorating terms of trade: the
increase in import prices exceeded that of export
prices by 0.7 per cent in 2004. This deterioration
is mainly due to developments in the product
group of machinery and equipment which
accounts for a large share, while the other prod-
uct groups neutralized the changes in each
other’s terms of trade.
GDP-based export and import data, however, do
not correctly reflect the direction of foreign trade
developments, as these statistics also contain
individual effects experienced in 2004 (including
purchases brought forward due to EU accession
in May and the imminent release of goods import-
ed from the EU and stored in public warehouses
described in detail in our earlier Reports), leading
to a distortion of the information on business
activity.
Thus, we seek to capture permanent trends of for-
eign trade turnover on the basis of the foreign tra-
de time series on goods only at current prices.
Consequently, with regard to the export of goods
we arrive at a picture corresponding to external
business activity: the trend of this process indi-
cates a slowdown from 2004 Q3 and that a further
deceleration took place in 2005 Q1. The trends in
the imports of goods not only show a decline, but
a straight stagnation from 2004 H2. The loss of
pace in the growth of the factors of high import
content characterizing domestic absorption (i.e.
household consumption and fixed investment)
can partly explain this, but with regard to the pre-
liminary nature of March foreign trade data, cau-
tion should be exercised in interpreting this stag-
nation.
Given the present tendencies in goods exports
and imports, the trade balance may continue to
improve in early 2005, even if a data revision may
still occur due to the preliminary nature of the data.
Owing to the slightly smaller deterioration of the
change in the terms of trade, it is likely that net
exports will show a weaker improvement based on
current price data than at constant prices.
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
30
—30
—20
—10
0
10
20
30
40
—30
—20
—10
0
10
20
30
40
00
 Q
1
00
 Q
3
01
 Q
1
01
 Q
3
02
 Q
1
02
 Q
3
03
 Q
1
03
 Q
3
04
 Q
1
04
 Q
3
Per cent Per cent
Manufacturing
Wholesale and retail trade
Total
Chart 2.8
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Although real exchange rates can also indicate
changes in competitiveness, in a broader context it
is advisable to take into consideration changes in
market share and export performance, in order to
obtain a more accurate picture of a country’s com-
petitiveness.The real effective exchange rate index
based on the manufacturing unit labour cost (ULC)
used as a cost-based indicator of competitiveness
showed a further increase in Q4, primarily due to the
continued nominal strengthening of the forint.
Relative unit labour costs also strengthened the real
exchange rate, because although the growth of
domestic labour costs came to a halt by the end of
the year, the decline of unit labour costs character-
istic for 2004 as a whole continued in Hungary’s ma-
jor foreign trade partner countries. In the whole of
2004, the exchange rate of the forint strengthened
by 3.2 per cent on ULC basis.
The OECD publishes comparable export perform-
ance data for a number of countries
5
. These data
show that in 2004 Hungary’s export performance
was as strong as it was in 2000. In 2004, the Czech
Republic showed an even more robust improvement
in export performance than Hungary, while it is sur-
prising that Poland’s export performance was weak,
similarly to what was seen during the last recession
in the world economy. 
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Export performance shows the changes in the exports of a given country in relation to the growth of its export market constituted by its major for-
eign trade partners. The indicator stands in direct relationship with market share, as a positive value means that the growth in exports by a given
country exceeds that of the total imports to the export market in question, meaning that the country's share is growing in the market in question.
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Chart 2.12 
Export performance in the Czech Republic, Poland and
Hungary*
Chart 2.11
Real effective exchange rate indices
2. 1. 6 Economic growth
In 2004, GDP grew by 4 per cent annually. As we
have already pointed out in the analysis of pro-
duction processes in addition to the momentum of
manufacturing and construction output, excep-
tionally robust agricultural output contributed to
this expansion to a great extent.
6
Growth in market
services was much more subdued.
On the uses side, GDP-growth was mainly fuelled
by the somewhat higher-than-expected consump-
tion (despite a slowdown following the high growth
rates in the last few years) and fixed investment
which, despite weakening in Q4, nevertheless
increased strongly for the year as a whole.
Furthermore, following its negative contribution in
2003 net exports were also conducive to growth
especially through their expansion in the second
half of the year. In contrast to the growth in the
stock of inventories (see 2.1.4) this item of GDP
resulted in a negative contribution, due to the fact
that non-specified uses, which is also contained
under this heading, exhibited a sharp drop in 2004.
As mentioned earlier, in 2004, net exports improved
simultaneously with deteriorating terms of trade.
The indicator of the Gross Domestic Income (GDI)
7
is arrived at by adjusting real-GDP by the changes
in the terms of trade, an indicator more suited for
assessing changes in the external balance of the
real economy than real-GDP when examining
domestic absorption. Following such adjustment
we can indeed see that due to the deterioration in
terms of trade GDI growth fell behind that of the
GDP in 2004, only increasing by 3.5 per cent.
As the GDP data for 2004 Q1 (and, subsequently,
2004 as a whole) was positively distorted by the
leap-year effect, there is a negative distortion in
the 2005 year-on-year indices due to the statistical
base effect. That is, the 2004 Q1 headline GDP
growth was biased upwards by some tenths of a
percentage point. This year, the distortion is in the
opposite direction, i.e. the headline GDP data may
be smaller than the underlying figure reflecting bu-
siness cycle developments (adjusted for calendar
effects). We estimate that of the headline 4.0 per
cent GDP growth in 2004, the leap-year effect may
have added some 0.2 percentage points, i.e. the
figure adjusted for this factor would have been
around 3.8 per cent.
8
In 2005 Q1, due to the slower growth primarily
on the output side at the beginning of the year,
we assume a slowdown in the GDP growth rate,
which is also justified by the expected changes
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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Chart 2.13
GDI* and GDP
(Percentage changes on a year earlier)
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6 
Based on the information currently available at the present it is impossible to determine what the extent of growth of the GDP last year could have been
'without' the outstanding contribution of agriculture. On the one hand, it is not clear to what extent last year's GDP data concerning agriculture can be
regarded final as they may be revised later. On the other hand, last year the uses side of GDP (excluding the line stocks + error) exhibited faster growth
than the production side which was counterbalanced by the negative value of the stocks + error line. And finally, another extraordinary item was also
present: the item 'balance of financial services and product taxes' ('FISIM') was negative last year, which partly counterbalanced the large positive con-
tribution of agriculture.
7
See: Manual to Hungarian Economic Statistics (MNB 2002).
8
See our August 2004 Report (p. 29). Please note that while the leap year effect was significant at the level of the GDP, we were not able to detect it in
any of its components. That is, currently we do not know which productions or uses side component could have caused the effect.
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in the items on the absorption side. A decline in
consumption is expected on the basis of retail
trade data, and fixed investment is not likely to
increase due to the decline in capacity utilisation
which has been going on for a year already. At
most, net export developments may be
favourable owing primarily to weak imports at the
beginning of the year as opposed to the intensive
expansion of exports. On 17 May, Ecostat pub-
lished its so-called flash estimate for 2005 Q1
GDP. This shows an annual 3 per cent increase
in GDP, which is in line with our projections with
the provision, that this is biased downwards from
the growth rate consistent with the current busi-
ness cycle situation, due to the leap-year effect.
The GDP of the Czech Republic (similarly to that
of Hungary) grew by 4 per cent in 2004 as a
whole, with a basically even increase in the
course of the year. Similarly to Hungary’s busi-
ness cycle, however, Poland’s economy slowed
down somewhat in 2004 H2 still growing by 5.4
per cent. In 2005 Q1, according to expectations
and data already available, GDP growth might
have decelerated in the region’s economies sim-
ilarly to that of Hungary.
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Annual GDP growth in the Czech Republic, Poland and
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Early 2005 data provide evidence that labour mar-
ket tightness continues to ease further.
9
In 2004
H1, the labour market was characterized by wage
growth of around 10 per cent, rising employment
and low unemployment which in our assessment
led to the labour market tightness of growing
labour demand and an increase in wage inflation
pressures. From mid-2004, however, as we point-
ed out in our Report last November, growth in
labour demand slowed down gradually. In the last
few months, labour use has remained flat in the
private sector, wage inflation has fallen further and
the unemployment rate has continued to increase.
In our view, two factors can explain these devel-
opments. On the one hand, the stagnation in
labour use is due to the weakening dynamics of
labour demand, corresponding to signs of a weak-
er business cycle. On the other hand, the decline
in wage inflation may indicate the beginning of
corporate wage adjustment to a lower inflation
environment.
2. 2. 1 Labour use
In early 2005, labour use in the private sector fluc-
tuated around the level typical for end-2004.
Based on the latest data, it seems that the dynam-
ic increase in labour use that started in mid-2003
came to a halt last year, as there was no further
growth in the last half of the year. In our view, this
stagnation of labour use stems from the fact, that
due to the impact of the slowdown in external
economic activity, corporate labour demand has
stopped expanding at the earlier rate. Labour use
in the private sector, however, does not show a
uniform picture: in manufacturing, which is affect-
ed more strongly by the slowdown in external
demand, labour use is continuing to decline,
while it is growing in the segment of market serv-
ices.
Similarly to previous Reports changes in labour
use are monitored with the help of statistics on
total hours worked, showing the number of
employees and labour intensity (average hours
2. 2 Labour market
34
9
Regarding the concept of labour market tightness there is no consensus in the literature. According to the definition of the Bank of England for
example the 'tightness' or 'looseness'of the labour market is determined by the difference between labour demand and labour supply (Bridgen A.
- Thomas J. (2003), 'What does economic theory tell us about labour market tightness?', Bank of England Working Paper no. 185.). As the differ-
ence between demand and supply cannot last in the long term the concepts of 'tightness' and 'looseness'only temporarily characterise the labour
market, i.e. in periods when the economy falls outside the long term equilibrium. In this framework it is the real unit labour cost that could be con-
sidered an adequate measure of the labour market. If the labour market is 'tight' ('loose') real unit labour costs increase (decrease). (In case of 'tight-
ness' real wages grow faster than productivity.) The increase (decrease) of real unit labour costs also indicates the increase (decrease) of infla-
tionary pressure. However, the above framework is somewhat simplified and only holds if certain technological assumptions prove to be correct. If
the assumtions prove to be false real unit labour costs provide a distorted picture of labour market 'tightness'. Consequently, the concepts of labour
market 'tightness' and 'looseness' are taken in a broader sense making a combined assessment of data on labour demand, unemployment and
wages. We consider the combined presence of the fall in labour demand, the decrease of wage inflation and the growth of unemployment as an
ease of labour market tightness.
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worked) simultaneously. In earlier Reports we
predicted a decline in the growth rate of total
hours worked, and recent data reveal that total
hours worked in the private sector did not
increase considerably in the last half year. The
halt in the growth of total hours worked was due
to the slowdown in the trend of both the number
of employees and labour intensity.
The stagnation in private sector labour use can
be explained by various developments in the
sector. The decline in total hours worked in man-
ufacturing continued at the same rate in early
2005. The long-term downward trend which start-
ed in early 2000 is partly due to the decline in the
textile industry. On the other hand, the stagnation
in the manufacturing employment excluding the
textile industry shows that – on the whole – no
significant employment expansion took place in
these sectors even during the economic recov-
ery. In our earlier analyses we explained this with
the assumption that corporations substituted
labour with capital, in part due to the increase in
unit labour costs in earlier years.
According to our assumptions, in addition to the
factors described above the decline in manufac-
turing labour use in the last few months also stems
from weaker external demand. On the one hand,
this is confirmed by the number of average week-
ly working hours which reflects the changes in the
labour market most rapidly; the rise in this indica-
tor also came to a halt at end-2004. Furthermore,
with regard to the machinery and equipment sec-
tor, which is sensitive to external economic activi-
ty, data from early 2005 also reveal a moderate
slowdown in the expansion of employment (which
had previously exhibited strong growth rates) and
a stagnation in average working hours.
Finally, the number of vacancies announced
recently also confirms the fact that corporate
labour demand has grown more subdued in
recent months. Following the upturn in mid-2004,
the number of recently announced vacancies
returned to its 2002 level.
In contrast to the manufacturing sector, labour
use continued to rise in market services.
Employment in market services increased by
nearly 10,000 employees in the first two months
of 2005 compared to the end of 2004. More than
half of this growth occurred in the sector ‘real
estate, renting and business activities’, particularly
in the field ‘business activities’ which has the largest
weight within the sector. Growth in retail employ-
Chart 2.17 
Average manual working hours and employment 
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Chart 2.18 
Employment and average working hours in machinery
and equipment
ment continued at the former moderate rate in early
2005.
10
Over the last few months, the increase was
mainly focused in the wholesale trade sector and as
such it cannot be directly attributed to the appear-
ance of new retail trade networks.
As a result of the above effects, private sector
employment has remained flat in the last few
months. Due to the fact that since mid-2004 the
government sector has dismissed more than
20,000 employees, whole-economy employment
declined in the last half of the year. We expect that
the decline in government employment will contin-
ue this year as well and that a further modest
decline in the whole-economy employment is likely
in 2005, as weak external demand will not lead to a
significant increase in private sector employment.
2. 2. 2 Labour market reserves and
tightness
The decline in employment has led to an increase
in the rate of unemployment in the past months. In
the first quarter, the number of unemployed was
45,000 higher than registered a year earlier, and the
unemployment rate has risen to over 7 per cent.
Most recent data reveal that unemployment has
been growing steadily since early 2004 and,
although the rise in number of the registered unem-
ployed came to a halt in January–February 2005,
we expect unemployment to increase further
dynamically in the first half of the year. This growth
in unemployment corresponds to our assumption
regarding the easing of the labour market tightness.
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Full-time employment in the private sector
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Whole-economy employment as per institutional 
statistics and the Labour Force Survey (LFS)
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10
Measurement of retail sector employment is rendered more difficult by the January 2004 increase of 20,000 employees in the time series calcu-
lated on the basis of institutional statistics. As the LFS statistics do not indicate this growth spike - indeed, employment even fell in 2004 Q1 - in our
view, the shift in levels in the time series was due to the methodological changes in institutional statistics in early 2004.  
Chart 2.19 
Recently announced vacancies
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The rise in unemployment is a process that has
been on-going for over a year now and is primari-
ly attributable to reasons associated with labour
demand. This is also revealed by the aggregate
rates: in 2004, the unemployment rate fell by 0.5
per cent, while the participation rate – an indica-
tor of labour supply – did not change significant-
ly. As mentioned in the preceding section, the
recent decline in whole-economy labour demand
is partly due to the reduction of government
employment and partly to subdued economic
activity affecting the private sector.
Consequently, the rise in unemployment can also
be attributed to cyclical effects to a certain
degree.
11
Looking at the aggregate unemployment time
series, however, the cyclical behaviour of unem-
ployment is not self-evident. Following 2001,
unemployment continued to decline in the years
of economic downturn and only rose temporarily
in 2003. This rise in unemployment, however,
took place during a phase of economic recovery.
In our earlier Reports we attributed this counter-
cyclical trend to individual factors (i.e. the signif-
icant rise in government employment in 2002 and
the robust increase in market services) as
opposed to the lack of cyclical effects. Indeed, if
we look at the number of unemployed laid off  in
the manufacturing sector, the cyclical fluctuation
is clear.
12
From the point of view of our forecast, it is of key
importance whether unemployment will behave
cyclically in the future. Will unemployment return to
Chart 2.22 
Number of registered unemployed and unemployment
based on the LFS
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Economic activity, employment and unemployment
11
See Section 4.5 for more analysis. 
12
Developments shown by the chart are mostly determined by the movement of two sectors: machinery and equipment and trade. It is important to
note that employment and unemployment grew paralelly in both sectors indicating major restructuring. 
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Number of unemployed dismissed from manufacturing
and market services (based on the LFS)
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
98
 Q
1
98
 Q
3
99
 Q
1
99
 Q
3
00
 Q
1
00
 Q
3
01
 Q
1
01
 Q
3
02
 Q
1
02
 Q
3
03
 Q
1
03
 Q
3
04
 Q
1
04
 Q
3
Thousands
Manufacturing Private services
Thousands
its earlier level when the business cycle strength-
ens? The possibility that a significant part of the
labour force which has been dismissed in recent
months may not find appropriate jobs even if
labour demand increases (that is if unemployment
becomes permanent) may have two conse-
quences. On one hand, the number of persons
potentially competing for jobs may fall leading to a
stronger wage bargaining position for employees
and an increase in wages. On the other hand, the
decrease in the available potential labour source
may deteriorate the long-term outlook for the
growth of the Hungarian economy.
2. 2. 3 Wage inflation
Based on the most recent data, it appears that the
wage inflation in the private sector continued to fall
at the beginning of the year. According to our
assumption, this decline in wage inflation is attrib-
utable to two factors. On the one hand, it seems
that in recent months the adjustment of wages to a
lower inflation environment has continued. On the
other hand, the stagnation of labour demand in the
private sector may also have reduced wage infla-
tion. Thus, declining wage inflation is also consis-
tent with our assumptions for the easing of labour
market tightness.
In our February Report, we indicated that we were
uncertain in the assessment of the pace of the
decline of wage inflation in early 2005. Based on
the data on the first few months of 2005 wage
adjustment seems to be accelerating. This is con-
firmed by the fact that the trend of wage inflation
has been revised downwards retrospectively,
based on supplementary data released most
recently. At the same time, however, the month-
by-month ‘revision’ of the end of the time series
underlines the large degree of uncertainty inherent
in monthly data.
Wage inflation in both manufacturing and market
services declined in early 2005. Although the time
series is distorted by a number of outliers due to
the uneven seasonality of bonus payments, it
seems that the decline in wage inflation was some-
what stronger in manufacturing, a phenomenon in
line with the fact that this sector is more sensitive to
the changes of external economic activity. On the
whole, we assume that following 2004, when man-
ufacturing wage inflation exceeded that of the mar-
ket services by about 1 percentage point, the dif-
ference in growth rates between the two sectors
has already declined by early 2005.
The dynamics of unit labour costs – one of the most
dominant cost-side factors of inflation – has
decreased significantly since 2001. The decelerat-
ing growth of unit labour costs was caused in part
by the gradual slowdown in the growth rates of
average labour costs: a clear indication of the start
of corporate wage adjustment to a lower inflation
environment following the minimum wage shocks.
In addition to this, the slowdown in the growth rate
of unit labour costs was also caused by stronger
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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* The chart indicates the sensitivity of seasonal adjustments to the inclu-
sion of new data points, not the revision of the original data.
Chart 2.25  
Effect of information received since our February Report
on the trend time series of wage inflation in the private
sector* 
(Month-on-month indices)
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growth in productivity. The decline in unit labour
costs was almost unbroken, except for a brief stop
in 2003 when in line with ‘sticky’ inflation expecta-
tions the fall in average labour cost came to a halt
and productivity growth also slowed down.
13
In 2004, unit wage costs declined further. At the
beginning of the year as a result of the decline in
employment (typically among the self-employed),
productivity grew significantly leading to a fall in
unit wage costs in the private sector. At end-2004,
the growth rate of unit labour costs stabilised at
around 4 per cent: the rate identical with that of the
sales prices proxied by the GDP-deflator.
The difference between the growth rates of sales
prices and unit labour costs can be considered an
indicator of the inflationary pressure on the wage
side. Assuming nominal rigidities, prices and unit
labour costs grow at the same rate only in a long-
term equilibrium, while in the short term the growth
of prices and wages may differ from each other. In
a period of disinflation a decline in corporate prof-
itability on the labour side forces companies to
restrict wage growth. At the same time, however,
the growth of unit labour costs cannot exceed that
of price inflation permanently as the decline of cor-
porate profitability may force price rises if other in-
put side costs cannot be reduced. The effect of
disinflation, therefore, can only be permanent if
unit labour costs grow at the same rate as prices.
14
Real unit labour costs directly indicate the differ-
ence between unit labour costs and prices (if the
13
As we indicated in our February Report the halt in productivity was due to significant data revisions on the production side of the GDP. As these
figures are not final, the growth of productivity of early 2003 - a fact difficult to explain by economic terms - can become smoother.  
14
This of course holds true only in a relatively simplified theoretical framework. In the case of non-unit capital-labour substitution elasticity for exam-
ple the substitution leads to labour costs - price growth rate different from 1 even in the long term (see Kátay et al. (2003): 'Some interrelationships
between national and international wage shares', Report on Financial Stability, MNB, June 2004).
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Chart 2.26 
Private sector wage inflation
(Same period of the previous year=100)
Chart 2.27 
Nominal unit labour cost (ULC), productivity and wages
in the private sector*
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter indices)
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Chart 2.28 
Nominal unit labour costs in manufacturing and market
services
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter indices)
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growth rate of unit labour costs is higher than that of
inflation real unit labour costs increase, while they
decrease in the opposite case). The chart on
Hungarian real unit labour costs shows that since
mid-2002 the difference between prices and unit
labour costs has been gradually diminishing, indi-
cating that wage adjustment has become more and
more flexible in parallel with the reduction of the
effect caused by minimum wage increases. On the
whole, in 2004, real unit wage costs fell to below the
level preceding the minimum wage increase, a
possible indication of the greater adjustment of
wages and easing inflationary pressure.
15
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15
The stagnation of real unit wage costs in the last quarter is difficult to assess owing to the strong volatility of nominal unit wage costs, and thus
we have not evaluated it for the time being.
* Sales prices were proxied by the GDP-deflator.
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2. 3 Inflation developments
In the first months of 2005, the decline in inflation
that started in mid-2004 continued. Based on the
data, in Q1 consumer prices were up 3.6 per cent
on average compared to the same period of the
previous year. The considerable decline of the
annual index relative to 2004 was caused by the
combined effect of the incorporation of the indirect
tax increases in the base and the sustained
impact of the disinflation trend that started around
mid-2004. The annual index of core inflation came
to 3.2 per cent in the first three months of the year.
Analysing the monthly developments together with
the quaterly ones, it is clear that the inflation data
in March showed a correction to the rapid disinfla-
tion which was seen in the previous months. This
correction was justified by the April data as well.
Looking at inflation developments in the context of
Europeran inflation convergence, following the
increase in the gap which was characteristic of
last year, since early 2005 the 12-month average
of the Hungarian harmonised index of consumer
prices started to come closer to the value of the
Maastrict criterion on inflation, which stood at
sligthly over 2 per cent in March of 2005.
The major macroeconomic variables which are
key to the disinflation process seen in 2004 H2
pushed down inflation in the first three month of
2005. Disinflation continued to be most prevalent
in the relatively stable exchange rate (based on
Table 2.1
Main inflation indicators in 2004 
(Annual percentage changes)
2004 2005
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Annual Q1
average
Core inflation 6.0 6.2 5.9 5.3 5.8 3.2
Unprocessed foods 4.9 8.0 11.9 1.5 6.6 -2.2
Vehicle fuel and market energy 1.0 7.8 7.6 10.0 6.6 6.4
Regulated prices 11.7 10.1 8.3 7.2 9.3 4.8
CPI 6.8 7.3 7.0 5.9 6.8 3.6
Chart 2.30 
Hungarian HICP and the Maastricht criterion on price
stability*
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* The definition of the criterion on price stability includes ‘inflation’ and
thus we have disregarded Member States with a negative 12-month aver-
age inflation rate when calculating the criterion on price stability. The
same practice was followed by the European Central Bank in the 2004
Convergence Report as well. Since the European Union expanded to 25
Members on 1 May 2004 we chose the three countries with the lowest infla-
tion from these 25 Member States from this date.
the data from the last nine months, the relative
deviation of the EUR/HUF exchange rate did not
reach 1 per cent) and in the circle of products
affected by import competition. At the same time,
the continued gradual slowdown in market servic-
es prices is a new phenomenon. The slowdown in
inflation seen in the services sector since mid-
2004 points to the growing presence of disinflation
effects on the demand side, reflected by the drop
in consumer demand and to the permanent nature
of lower inflation. Lower inflation expectations
characteristic of almost every economic sector
have also contributed to falling inflation. The posi-
tive effect on the consumer price index of the
gradual slowdown in core inflation in Q1, particu-
larly in March, was only slightly offset by rises –
driven mainly by global price developments – in a
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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The measure of core inflation is often used in our Reports as
a variable best expressing inflation trends in the economy.
The international literature, however, uses a number of other
inflation measures which also accurately describe economic
price developments.
One common characteristic of all of these measures is that
they all attempt to establish a new measure based on the price
changes of the disaggregated items of the overall CPI by way
of certain well-defined statistical transformations. In order
for the price indices created in this manner to be of assistence
in economic policy decision-making, a number of other useful
properties are expected of them: first and foremost, they
should exhibit lower volatility than the overall consumer infla-
tion time series; they should follow the current trend changes
of inflation and should thus provide information on expected
inflation developments at the time horizon relevant for eco-
nomic policy.
16
The measures of inflation which fulfil these criteria best can
be divided into three groups, typically distinguished by the
methods of calculation: a) core inflation measures which per-
manently filter out certain price effects; b) so-called
Edgeworth type CPIs weighted by backward-looking vari-
ance; and c) trimmed averages.
The core inflation indicator which is calculated by the CSO in
Hungary is the most obvious example of the first measure. In
the case of this measure, items in respect of which the prices
are not determined by the demand and supply relations of the
economy are simply disregarded. The prices of these disre-
garded products are primarily affected by world market
effects (the prices of crude oil and other commodities), weath-
er conditions (unprocessed foods) and administrative meas-
ures (regulated prices). In addition to the fact that it is simple
to calculate, our use of this measure may also stem from the
fact that owing to its manner of calculation core inflation
mainly includes items which are best influenced by monetary
policy. The greatest disadvantage is the mechanical nature of
the calculation method, resulting in the problem that certain
products are excluded from core inflation the prices of which
Box 2.1 Alternative measures for assessing underlying inflation developments
16
For more details on this see Barnabás Ferenczi, Sándor Valkovszky, János Vincze: What are consumer price statistics good for? (MNB Working
Paper Series, 2000/5) and Juan-Luis Vega, Mark A. Wynne: An evaluation of some measures of core inflation for the euro area (ECB Working Paper
Series, April 2001). 
Chart 2.31 
Core inflation
(Seasonally adjusted, annualised quarter-on-quarter
growth rates)
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few price categories excluded from the core
measure of inflation.
On average, prices of tradables fell in 2005 Q1.
Apart from a few periods of significant exchange
rate weakening, the downward trend in the price of
consumer durables has been continuous since
band widening. One new phenomenon however,
was that – following a continuous decline in growth
rates over three quarters – prices of non-durables
also fell in the first three months of 2005. The sta-
ble development of the exchange rate may have
increased the possibility of exchange rate pass-
through to the prices of both product groups. In
addition to this, the decline in tradables prices was
also enhanced by the slower inflation in the mar-
kets of Hungary’s major foreign trade partners.
Weaker inflation in imported goods (driven by
exogenous price and exchange rate develop-
are already determined by the demand and supply position of
the market.
By adjusting the weighting of the data, the Edgeworth type
price index, which is weighted by variance, attributes smaller
significance to price developments with higher volatility than to
developments with more stability over time. In the case of the
Edgeworth type price indices, the weights used when calculat-
ing the aggregate measure are calculated from the past vari-
ance of a given item (typically over the last 24 or 36 months).
As the weights are inversely proportional to variance, the items
with higher past volatility may have a smaller weight, while
items with lower volatility may have a larger weight. The
advantage of this measure is that it is based on the largest pos-
sible set of information with the aggregate measure showing
every change in the prices. Its disadvantage, however, is that it
may lead to strong distortions in various cases. Such cases
include indirect tax modifications with the indirect tax changes
of certain products distorting the relative variance proportions
otherwise present among the products. Managing products
with price changes restricted only to a few time intervals in a
year may present another problem as the weight of these prod-
ucts is overrepresented due to the low variability of price
changes. Solving this problem requires arbitrary intervention.
The calculation of trimmed average is partly similar to the cal-
culation of the first type core inflation measure. The difference
is that in this case items are not arbitrarily and permanently
disregarded in the calculation of the average, but rather the
products or services with the most extreme price changes are
‘trimmed off’ at the lowest or the highest end of the distribu-
tion. The advantage of the calculation of this measure is that it
captures underlying inflation developments in the economy
using the statistical properties of price changes, while its deter-
mination requires much more calculations – especially finding
the optimum size of trimming – than in the case of the other two
measures.
Calculation of the aforementieond indices for Hungarian price
developments leads us to draw the following conclusions:
according to all the measures, after last year’s indirect tax
changes the economy has been characterised by strong disin-
flation processes since 2004 H2. At the same time, it is also
clear that this process of rapid disinflation slowed down signif-
icantly in March and April of 2005.
Chart 2.32 
Indicators of underlying inflation
(Year-on-year indices)
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ments) may also have had a dampening effect on
the price-setting decisions of domestic companies
competing in the market with these goods.
Stronger market competition in the market of trad-
ables following the EU accession is another disin-
flation factor which has an effect not only on the
price-setting decisions of producers but of retailers
as well.
In early 2005, inflation in market services continued
declining, in line with the trend which started in the
second half of last year. In our February Report we
deemed the above developments uncertain, but
events taking place since then have confirmed a
scenario which was only viewed as one of the pos-
sible explanations in the past, according to which
the gradual disinflation which has started in market
services could indicate the sustainable nature of
the disinflationary path. Labour market develop-
ments since mid-2004 justify a lower inflation envi-
ronment than previously, both on the demand and
on the supply side. In the services sector, the
decline in wage inflation which started in mid-2004
may have contributed to the slowing pace of price
increases in market services on the cost side, while
the decelerating growth characteristic of all sectors
may have had the same effect on the demand side.
The price decisions of economic agents active in
this sector may also have been restricted by infla-
tion expectations which have been continuously
declining since mid-2004.
Similar to the second half of last year, prices of
processed foods have continued to fall in 2005. We
consider the price increase subdued at an annual
level as well: the 1.8% rate in increase registered in
the first quarter was just marginally higher than the
lowest rate which was recorded in mid-2003, due
to both lasting and temporary effects. Following
Hungary’s EU accession, stronger import competi-
tion contributed to persistently lower price increas-
es affecting sales as well as production.
17
Simultaneously with this, last year’s favourable har-
vest may also have pushed down the cost-side
inflationary pressure on processed foods via the
purchase price of unprocessed foods. Strong mar-
ket competition coupled with the stable exchange
rate may also have contributed to the pricing
behaviour of these goods, in an adjustment to the
low inflation environment typical on the internation-
al markets of processed foods. Looking at disag-
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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Chart 2.33 
Hungarian and imported inflation
(Seasonally adjusted, annualised quarter-on-quarter
growth rates)
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Chart 2.34 
Inflation of market services
(Seasonally adjusted, annualised quarter-on-quarter
growth rates)
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For more details see Section 4.6.
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gregated price developments, we see that,
although the growth rate of prices fell in the whole
product group, disinflation in milk and dairy prod-
ucts was above average: the prices of these prod-
ucts have been falling for months.
Following indirect tax increases in 2004 H2,
increasingly keen market competition, which was
partly generated by growing import competition as
well, influenced the development of alcohol and
tobacco prices. To a certain degree, these price-
dampening effects remained strong in 2005 Q1. As
a result of the competition in the tobacco market at
end-2004 prices started to fall this year following
depletion of old stocks. In the same period alcohol
prices remained flat which is a typical resultant of
two contrasting price effects. While in the first
months of 2005 the prices of all alcoholic products
fell, in March the price of beer having the largest
weight increased. The latter development could be
due to the direct inflation effects of the introduction
of the product fee and to the inflation effects
appearing through the temporary easing of market
competition as a result of the higher fee burden on
cheaper (canned) beers.
In the previous quarter, the more volatile items of
the consumer price index boosted the total con-
sumer price index to a small extent. As men-
tioned earlier, the prices of unprocessed foods
mitigated inflation from the point of view of both
primary and secondary effects, whereas fuel and
regulated prices grew more rapidly than overall
inflation.
The prices of unprocessed foods have been
falling for the second consecutive quarter.
Deflation in this product group was due to the
impact of last year’s very favourable harvest on
prices, a development also seen in neighbouring
Central and Eastern European countries, not only
in Hungary. Although the decline in prices can be
considered a general phenomenon, the prices of
a few products (e.g. vegetables) increased.
World market prices for crude oil have increased
significantly over the past quarters. Although the
Chart 2.35 
Prices of processed foods and dairy products in particular
(Seasonally adjusted, annualised quarter-on-quarter
growth rates)
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Chart 2.36 
Alcohol and tobacco prices
(Seasonally adjusted, annualised quarter-on-quarter
growth rates)
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Prices of unprocessed foods
(Seasonally adjusted data)
380
400
420
440
460
480
500
520
380
400
420
440
460
480
500
520
01
 Q
1
01
 Q
2
01
 Q
3
01
 Q
4
02
 Q
1
02
 Q
2
02
 Q
3
02
 Q
4
03
 Q
1
03
 Q
2
03
 Q
3
03
 Q
4
04
 Q
1
04
 Q
2
04
 Q
3
04
 Q
4
05
 Q
1
Dec.1991=100 Dec. 1991=100
price increase was partly caused by regional
problems and speculative factors, it was primarily
due to the fundamental rearrangement of the
world supply and demand for oil. This is confirmed
by the fact that last year’ average world market
crude oil prices were 45 per cent higher than in
the preceding twelve months. The impact of com-
modity price increases on vehicle fuel was damp-
ened by several factors in Hungary: the increase
in oil prices expressed in US dollar was counter-
balanced by the strengthening of the forint vis-à-
vis the dollar, while the degree of inflation realised
in petrol prices is significantly reduced by the high
(two-thirds) tax content of the fuel prices typically
defined in forints. Although this year the amount of
tax on vehicle fuel was no longer reduced by the
government, actual price increases could be con-
sidered subdued in comparison to world market
developments.
Following last year’s indirect tax increases, the
inflationary pressure caused by products and
services with regulated prices continuously
declined until February 2005. Weaker annual
growth was prevalent in almost all items, with an
especially spectacular drop in the prices of ener-
gy and pharmaceutical products. The annual
indices of pharmaceuticals prices was consistent-
ly negative in 2005, due to the base effect caused
by the freezing of subsidised pharmaceuticals
prices in April 2004. Inflation data in March
showed a slight increase in inflationary pressure
caused by the significant price hikes in electricity
and gambling.
2. 3. 1 Inflation expectations
As we repeatedly underlined in our analyses pre-
pared over the last one and a half years, inflation
expectations are one of the key factors contribut-
ing to the success of the disinflation developments
following the indirect tax shock. Examining the
developments of 2005 Q1 and 2004 H2 we can
conclude that the permanent incorporation of the
one-off price rising effects of indirect tax increas-
es into inflation expectations was successfully
averted in Hungary. Accordingly, inflation expec-
tations have played a key role in the rapid disinfla-
tion process since mid-2004. In 2005 Q1 both pro-
fessional analysts and households’ expectations
regarding the development of inflation moved
towards a lower inflation environment.
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Chart 2.38 
World market crude oil prices and the consumer price
of petrol
(Year-on-year changes)
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Enterprises
We have received no new information on corporate
managers’ perception of inflation since our last
Report and thus we can only repeat what we wrote in
our February Report in this regard. Data on corporate
managers’ perception of inflation confirm our
assumption that the one-off direct tax shock has not
been permanently built into corporations’ pricing and
wage-setting behaviour. This hypothesis may also be
confirmed by the fall of wage inflation in early 2005.
Households
In early 2005, households also assessed the per-
ceived and expected changes in inflation devel-
opments more favourably than in the preceding
quarter. Following the indirect tax shock house-
holds’ inflation developments returned to the val-
ues of 2003 H1 which were characterised by
favourable inflation outlook.
Professional analysts
Analysts surveyed by Reuters were surprised by
the rapid decline in inflation in early 2005. The much
better-than-expected actual data appeared most
clearly in the March survey as is usually the case
when assessing long-term inflation developments.
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Inflation perceived and expected by households*
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Chart 2.41 
Responses to inflation-related questions in GKI’s survey
of households*
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Chart 2.42 
Inflation forecasts of professional analysts in the Reuters
survey
(annual changes)
In effect, analysts adjusted their inflation projections
for 2005 and 2006 downwards. At the same time,
however, the fact that they made greater adjust-
ments to their projections with shorter time horizon
may indicate that in their perception strong effects
considered temporary may have played a role in
the recent decline in inflation. According to analysts
the inflation targets of monetary policy seem to be
feasible in the current macroeconomic environment
in both 2005 and in 2006.
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3 Inflation outlook

51
3. 1 Overview of the projection
Over the forecast horizon, assuming a central bank
base rate of 7.5 per cent, a nominal exchange rate
of roughly 248 HUF/EUR (as prevailed in April 2005)
and that all other, technical assumptions apply, the
consumer price index is expected to be between
3–3.5 per cent at the end of 2005 and 2006. In gen-
eral, our current projection reinforces the inflationary
outlook described in the February Report. The major
difference between this and the last projection is that
now we forecast a more marked slowdown in core
inflation, while factors not affected by monetary pol-
icy point to slightly higher inflation.
In our forecast, longer-term effects foreshadow a
stable, low-inflation environment. At the beginning of
the forecast horizon, as a result of factors that may
be considered temporary, a further slowdown in
core inflation is expected, with trend inflation then
gradually approaching its longer-term path.
In our projection, amongst the domestic factors
affecting inflation, developments in unit labour costs
and the strength of market competition must to be
underlined. An increase in labour market reserves
and the adaptation of companies’ labour demand to
the prevailing business conditions will lead to a
decline in wage inflation. We expect market compe-
tition to grow even stronger in certain market seg-
ments.
18
In our projection, demand-side factors tend
to be neutral or moderately point towards lower infla-
tion. Moderate increase in household consumption
will dampen demand-pull inflationary pressure
especially in market services.
Another fundamental determinant of inflation devel-
opments is imported inflation. If our exchange rate
assumption is realised, inflation of foreign origin will
have a reducing effect on core inflation over our
entire projection horizon as well. Prices of traded
products of our major trading partners are expected
to rise only slightly. On the other hand, the current
stable nominal exchange rate and import competi-
tion, which is becoming more fierce at international
level as well, dampen the domestic effects of import-
ed inflationary pressures originating in energy and
commodity markets.
In our previous Reports, the direct effects of
exchange rate were considered the most important
factor determining disinflation. In addition to this, in
our current projection secondary effects, i.e. loosen-
ing of labour market conditions and declining wage
growth play a key role. The above developments are
considerably facilitated by the notable dampening
of inflationary expectations, which will play a major
role in the future reduction of wage inflation as well.
Disinflation commenced in 2004 H2 and strength-
ened further in 2005 Q1. However, the decrease in
inflation at the beginning of 2005 is partly attributa-
ble to temporary reasons. This means that there are
several underlying developments which may mainly
be interpreted as a shift in price level, and when
adjustment to the new price level is achieved, the
effect of these factors will not be reflected in the
inflation index any more.
The stable forint exchange rate of the previous peri-
od resulted in a reduction of tradable goods prices.
Over the longer run, however, if the assumed
exchange rate path is realised, the price change of
this product group will approach the slightly positive
pace of price change of imported products meas-
ured in foreign currency. In addition to the above,
the decline in the prices of tobacco and some alco-
hol products, the considerable decrease in car
18
A sector like this, for example, is retail trade, where market structure alteration attributable to the EU accession as well may stimulate competition
in a more lasting manner, thus reducing the profit margin.
prices of late and the import competition in certain
product groups following EU-accession are con-
sidered transitional. These developments are
gradually losing their importance, although the
duration of this process is uncertain. Therefore,
despite the fact that inflationary trends are creat-
ing an environment of lower inflation, the exclusion
of temporary effects from the base indicates that
inflation will stagnate for the first part of our pro-
jection horizon, and then rise slightly.
According to our risk assessment, if our assump-
tions on interest rates and exchange rates apply, at
end 2006, the time horizon relevant from a monetary
policy aspect, there is a high probability that inflation
will fall in the target range of 3.5 ± 1 per cent. The
probability of inflation being lower than the target
range is somewhat higher (30 per cent) than that of
it being higher than the target (around 20 per cent).
According to our evaluation, the most important
uncertainty factor surrounding our central inflation
projection is whether the increasingly fierce mar-
ket competition will result in a temporary or a mo-
re permanent decline in inflation. In our central
projection, we assume that market competition is
going to become keener only in certain market
segments over the longer run. However, it is con-
ceivable that the increase in competition will
become more and more perceptible in other mar-
ket segments as well, which may result in lower
corporate price mark-ups than the current path,
consequently, leading to lower inflation.
Another important uncertainty factor is the actual
extent of labour market looseness and the reduc-
tion in wage inflation resulting from the increase in
unemployment. An increase in frictional unem-
ployment may also play a role in the rise in unem-
ployment. A longer duration for job searches may
result in higher unemployment for a longer period
of time. However, in this case increasing unem-
ployment would not imply an improvement in
employers’ bargaining positions or a deterioration
in that of employees. Moreover, tightening of
labour sources may dampen potential output,
which may make demand-pull inflationary pressure
more important and may also boost cost-push
inflationary pressures. As our central projection
assumes a loosening of the labour market, we con-
sider this effect as a risk towards higher inflation.
In terms of developments in external demand, there
is high probability of a scenario which is even less
favourable than the scenario set forth in the central
projection. Thus, this represents an uncertainty fac-
tor pointing more towards lower inflation. Since there
is a fairly significant difference between our fiscal
assumption for 2006 and the risk-based path (which
takes account of existing fiscal measures and trends
only), our evaluation suggests that relative to the
central projection the demand effect of fiscal policy
may imply risks slightly pointing towards higher infla-
tion. We think that the usual uncertainty of oil and
energy prices also points towards higher inflation.
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Chart 3.1 
Inflation fan chart*
(Percentage changes on a year earlier)
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* The fan chart represents the uncertainty around the central projection.
Overall, the coloured area represents a 90 per cent probability. The cen-
tral, darkest area – containing our main scenario as the mode of the dis-
tribution – refers to 30 per cent of the probability. The end-year points
denote the announced inflation targets, while the two lines denote a toler-
ance interval of ±1 per cent assigned to the targets.
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3. 2 Details of the main scenario
The projection depicted in this Report is condi-
tional. This conditionality means that in this Report
the underlying assumptions are that the following
conditions remain unchanged: 7.5 per cent central
bank base rate, roughly 7 per cent long-term inte-
rest rate and the average April exchange rate of
HUF 248.2 per EUR. Our projection also assumes
gradually declining world market prices for oil (but
generally speaking, still above 50 USD) until end-
2006, based on futures prices and a stable
EUR/USD exchange rate.
3. 2. 1 Expected trends in the business
cycle 
As presented in sub-section 2.1, our assessment of
the external business cycle is based on a variety of
information. While at the beginning of our forecast
horizon confidence indicators and data on stock of
existing orders foreshadow a weaker external im-
port demand, later – in accordance with other fore-
casting institutions’ projections – domestic
demand and consequently also import demand of
Hungary’s partners starts to increase again.
Although global oil prices are expected to decline,
they stand at a high level, which has a negative
effect on Hungary’s external import demand as
well. Our projection may be considered conserva-
tive in the sense that we expect a more moderate
upswing than other forecasting institutions.
According to our projection, after a temporary
stagnation of one or two quarters Hungarian
exporters’ market share will return to its earlier
longer-term positive trend, deriving from foreign
trade integration. As will later be presented, the
corporate sector and especially export sensitive
Table 3.1 Az alappályát meghatározó fõbb feltevéseink* 
Major assumptions determining the main scenario
2005 2006
Central bank base rate (per cent)** 7.5 7.5
5-year yield (per cent)** 7.0 7.0
HUF/EUR exchange rate (forint)* 247.4 248.2
USD/EUR exchange rate (cent)* 129.9 129.5
Brent oil price (US dollar/barrel)** 54.0 51.5
* Annual average on the basis of the April 2005 averages.
** End-year figures.
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Chart 3.2 
Expected trends in the export market share and the real
exchange rate*
(2000=100)
industries (manufacturing) will adapt to the
somewhat less favourable external demand by
reducing their labour demand and thus by tem-
pering wage inflation. Consequently, we expect
a stagnation of the ULC-based real exchange
rate, which best reflects competitiveness. Ove-
rall, the growth rate of Hungary’s exports is
expected to increase between by 8 – 10 per cent
in 2005 and 2006 as well.
Following the 2004 Q4 slowdown, which we
deem as a temporary phase, corporate invest-
ments will pick up again. In 2006, investment
activity is expected to be more balanced, in
accordance with the developments in external
business conditions and economic growth.
Corporate investment growth is to amount to 4
per cent in 2005, while a more dynamic upswing
exceeding 6 per cent is anticipated for 2006.
Looking ahead, dynamic expansion in public
investment is expected, while household fixed
investment is projected to continue to decline.
The latter is caused by delayed effects of earlier
changes in housing subsidies. Consequently,
household fixed investment will contribute to the
whole economy total investment only to a lesser
extent or subtract from it, while corporate and
public investment will become increasingly
important. Overall, compared to year 2004, all of
these processes will result in a slowdown in
whole economy gross fixed capital formation
and an approximately 4.5–5 per cent growth in
both years.
As external and domestic business conditions
become somewhat less favourable, the corpo-
rate sector will be compelled to adjust itself to
this situation. Latest labour market information
suggests that the adjustment of the private sec-
tor’s labour demand to the prevailing business
conditions has resulted in a decline in the
demand for labour and thus a rise in the unem-
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Table 3.2 
Trends in external demand*
(Percentage changes on a year earlier)
2004 2005 2006
Actual/estimate Projection
MNB 5.9 5.3 5.7
OECD 5.9 5.4 7.4
European Commission 6.2 6.2 6.3
IMF 6.0 6.4 6.9
* External demand: weighted import demand of Hungary’s major export partners. 
Source: own calculations based on IMF World Economic Outlook, OECD Economic Outlook, EC Economic Forecasts.
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ployment rate. The decline in labour demand
may also lead to the assumption that the tight-
ness deriving from the shortage of skilled labour
may have eased as well.
Current data for the beginning of this year indi-
cate that the private sector’s labour demand is
dropping due to the slowdown in business activ-
ity. According to our projection, this will be fol-
lowed by a gradual, modest increase in the
future. As far as the sectoral composition of this
modest increase is concerned, market services
more sensitive to domestic demand will continue
to absorb labour, while employment in manufac-
turing will further decline in 2005. Later, howev-
er, the number of employed will slightly grow in
this latter sector as well. Private employment will
stagnate in 2005, while growth of slightly below
1 per cent is projected for 2006. We assume that
the number of employed in the public sector will
continuously decline over our forecast horizon.
Unemployment is projected to temporarily
increase to 7 per cent, then later start declining
gradually, falling to between 6.5 – 7 per cent at
end 2006.
Easing inflationary pressure from the labour mar-
ket and more modest inflationary expectations in
general will have an effect on wage bargaining
as well. Short-term information also confirm the
slowdown in private wage inflation. In our pro-
jection, wage inflation in the private sector will
slow significantly; to 7 per cent and 6.6 per cent
for 2005 and 2006, respectively.
The increase in productivity resulting from the
slowdown in the corporate sector’s labour
demand will have a moderating effect on wages
and unit labour costs, which are extremely
important in terms of cost-side inflationary ten-
sions. According to our calculations, unit labour
costs will grow by approximately 3 per cent and
2 per cent in 2005 and 2006, respectively. Unit
labour costs will increase more slowly than infla-
tion, resulting in the restoration of corporate sec-
tor profitability. Later, cost inflation pressure will
be dampened considerably by the anticipated
decline in real unit labour costs. Thus, alongside
the main scenario the increase in unit labour
costs in general will more and more harmonise
with a lower inflationary environment.
Simultaneously with the slowdown in wage infla-
tion, household real disposable income will also
grow more slowly than previously. Net real
labour income growth is forecast to grow by
slightly more than 2 and 3 per cent in 2005 and
2006, respectively.
19
Considering the already
announced fiscal measures, real financial trans-
fers – another determining factor of disposable
income – will grow by 3–3.5 per cent over our
forecast horizon. However, the so-called ‘other
income items’ are surrounded by high uncertain-
ty. Overall, the increase in real disposable
income, which was around 4 per cent in 2004, is
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Due to changes in taxes, real net earnings are expected to grow approximately 0.8 per cent faster than gross earnings in 2005. This estimation
is different from the statistical difference calculated by the CSO as our estimate includes changes in the tax burden deriving from all changes in the
personal income tax system (e.g. modification of tax allowances). However, as a result of a decline in employment in 2005, real net income will
increase more slowly than average real wages.
Chart 3.4 
Development of unemployment rate*
estimated to slow down to approximately 3-3.5
per cent in 2005 and 2006.
Household consumption demand will slow down,
declining to a similar extent as income growth.
This slowdown may be confirmed by some short-
term indicators. Retail sales for January and
February slowed, net borrowing by households
dropped and car sales fell in the first quarter of
this year. Short-term confidence indicators and
the increase in unemployment might be con-
ducive to precautionary savings. This view is
supported by the fact that households have a
high consumption/income ratio and they may not
be able to offset the income effect deriving from
the slowdown in real income by further borrow-
ing.
20
All in all, we project around 2.7–3 per cent
growth in consumption expenditure on our fore-
cast horizon.
Investments will continue to play a balanced role
in the increase in aggregate demand, while the
contribution of final consumption will stabilise in
a lower level than in previous years. Since within
aggregate demand items with lower import-con-
tent play a decisive role, and exports – despite
the temporary slowdown in external demand –
will continue to grow dynamically, imports are
expected to grow by 8–9 per cent in 2005 and
2006. All in all, the positive growth contribution
of net exports will diminish as domestic absorp-
tion gains momentum. In addition to the above,
changes in the terms of trade, which will slightly
deteriorate, have also been taken into account in
our projection. The growth rate of the so-called
gross domestic income (GDI), which filters out
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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Chart 3.7 
Household consumption expenditure and disposable
income*
(Quarter-on-quarter growth rates)
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The reason for this is that a significant amount of housing loans and consumer credits extended to households in previous years have increased
households' instalment-to-income ratio (to around 8 per cent). For more details see Report on Financial Stability, MNB, April 2005.
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Chart 3.5 
Unit labour costs in private sector*
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates)
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terms-of-trade effects, will be close to that of the
GDP.
21
Business cycle developments will result in stable
GDP growth: 3.5 – 3.6 per cent growth is projec-
ted for both years. Given our estimate for the
underlying (i.e. adjusted for calendar effects)
growth rate of 3.8 per cent for 2004, this implies
a slight slowdown in the rate of economic growth
(note that the headline GDP data may show
greater volatility due to the calendar effect: a
drop from last year’s 4.0 per cent to roughly 3.3
per cent this year). Taking all this information
together and based on our 3-4 percent estima-
tion for growth of potential GDP, we expect the
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Deterioration in the terms of trade may have a negative effect on consumption demand and thus on imports in the longer run. For the details on
the macroeconomic effects of oil price increases, see Section 4.8 of the August 2004 Report.
Table 3.3 Projections in the main scenario
Projections in the main scenario
(Percentage changes on a year earlier)
2004 2005 2006
Growth
Household consumption 2.8 2.1 2.8
Household consumption expenditure 3.5 2.7 3.0
Gross fixed capital formation 8.3 4.5 5.2
Domestic absorption 3.3 3.1 3.4
Exports 15.7 8.5 9.6
Imports 14.0 7.7 9.0
GDP 3.8 (4.0)* 3.5 (3.3) * 3.6
Households
Real disposable income 4.0 ** 3.4 2.7
Labour market (private sector)
Wages 9.3 7.0 6.6
Employment -0.3 -0.1 0.8
Unit labour cost 3.1 2.9 1.8
* In 2004 the leap-year effect may have caused an upward distortion amounting to some 0.2 percentage points in GDP, i.e. instead of the 4.0 headline
GDP growth, the underlying figure adjusted for calendar effects was probably around 3.8 per cent. In 2005 the distortion  is to the negative direction.
Our 3.5 per cent growth projection is consistent with the underlying 3.8 per cent growth estimated for 2004. ** MNB estimate.
Chart 3.8 
Economic growth and its constituents*
* Contribution of individual factors to GDP growth, percentage points.
output gap to close. All in all, the role of demand
inflation factors will disappear, additional inflation-
ary pressure from the aggregate demand side is
not expected.
3. 2. 2 Details of the main scenario
inflation forecast
Provided that our assumptions hold true, we pro-
ject a consumer price index of around 3–3.5 per
cent both in December 2005 and 2006. Core infla-
tion, due to its partly temporary decline at the
beginning of 2005, will be low in 2005, while in
2006 it will converge to slightly higher than 3 per
cent, consistent with the growth in unit labour
costs.
Meanwhile, after a certain period of time, external
imported inflation factors will contribute to the
decline in core inflation only to a lesser extent.
Exchange rate-based, direct disinflation factors
are gradually losing their importance, and domes-
tic factors (which have a relation to wage costs)
start to dominate. Core inflation may be diverted
from this by the strength of market competition
(companies’ price mark-ups) mostly in the begin-
ning of our forecast horizon.
Accelerating core inflation is expected in the short-
er run, although it will rather be reflected in the
short-base (quarter-on-quarter) indices. Annual
indices will still remain at a low level due to the sta-
tistical base effect. As mentioned, in 2005 Q1 core
inflation was reduced by several factors which are
not expected to persist over the longer run. The
profile of exchange rate pass-through is the most
important factor in the transient acceleration of
core inflation. If the current nominal exchange rate
remains stable, the price level will gradually
approach its new equilibrium value. However,
gradual adjustment leads to a lesser and lesser
inflation slowdown (rate of price changes). In
recent quarters, market services inflation, presum-
ably in accordance with slackening consumption
demand, have continuously declined. Taking into
account the long-term inflation differential between
industrial goods and services, we assume a stag-
nation in inflation of market services.
In addition to the above effects, other factors also
play a role in the acceleration of core inflation. One
of them is the recent decline in tobacco prices,
which is attributable to market competition.
However, a further fall in tobacco prices is unlike-
ly. Prices in certain product groups (some indus-
trial goods, alcohol, milk and dairy products) are
declining, mainly due to EU accession and as a
result of a more fierce competition in retail trade.
No lasting deflation is expected in case of the
price level of these products, because most price-
equalisation processes have already taken place.
The previously mentioned factors can also be illus-
trated in Chart 3.9, where first the quarterly rate of
core inflation increases, then gradually becomes
stable at the level determined by longer term
processes.
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market services, alcoholic beverages and tobacco products) by the MNB for
the purpose of analysis and forecasting. For technical reasons, this indicator
may, in the short term, be different from the core inflation index published
by the CSO. Over the longer term, however, both follow identical trends.
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Trend inflation developments*
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Regarding other inflation processes, unprocessed
food prices will grow at a moderate pace. An aver-
age 0.5 per cent quarterly price increase is
expected in this product group. The increasing
competition attributable to EU accession as well
has lesser importance in case of these products.
Agricultural producer prices are expected to be
broadly stable or to grow only slightly.
Our central projection is based on futures oil
prices, which will result in a gradual decline in mo-
tor fuel prices from 2005 H2. However, due to the
base effects, lower prices will be reflected in annu-
al indices starting only from 2006 Q2.
Regulated prices are expected to change by 6.8
per cent in the end of 2005. In our projection for
end-2006, most regulated prices are assumed to
increase by 3.2 per cent, in line with core inflation.
Table 3.4 
CPI and its major constituents in the main scenario
(Percentage changes on a year earlier)
2004 2005 2006
Actual Forecast
Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
CPI 7.0 5.9 3.5 3.5 3.1 3.1 3.9 3.4 3.2 3.2
Core inflation
(CSO actual) 5.9 5.3 3.2
Core inflation*
(MNB estimate) 6.1 5.5 3.4
Unprocessed food 11.9 1.4 -2.2 0.4 -2.7 0.2 4.4 3.4 2.0 3.3
Motor fuels and 
market-priced energy
7.6 10.0 6.4 8.3 7.8 6.6 7.7 2.6 0.5 -0.4
Regulated prices 8.3 7.2 4.8 6.5 6.7 6.8 5.4 3.9 3.5 3.2
* For technical reasons, our projected indicator may, in the short term, be different from the index published by the CSO. Over the longer term, howev-
er, both follow identical trends. The cause of this technical discrepancy is that  core inflation calculated by the CSO cannot accurately be reproduced from
available group CPI data, since the CSO breaks down several groups into core inflation items and sub-items excluded from them (e.g. pharmaceuticals).
Therefore, in our projection we adopted an approximation, which, in respect of its trend, will not over the long run result in any departure from the core
inflation values published by the CSO.
2.4 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.3 3.4 3.5
Table 3.5 
Highlighted CPI indices in the main scenario
(Percentage changes on a year earlier)
2004 2005 2006
Actual Forecast
December 5.5 3.3 3.2
Annual 
average
6.8 3.3 3.4
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4. 1 Background information on the projections
22
Table 4.1
Changes in the central projections relative to February
(Percentage changes on a year earlier, unless otherwise indicated)
1
Correction of ESA deficit with payments to and from private pension funds. 
2
Cash based deficit of the general government excluding certain extraordinary
revenue and expenditure, and including quasi-fiscal activities recorded outside the general government. 
3
Calculated from the so-called augmented (SNA) type
indicator; a negative value means a narrowing of aggregate demand. 
4
13th-month salaries carried over from 2004 to January 2005 in the public sector cause
a downward bias of the 2004 wage growth indicator and an upward bias of that in 2005. Corrected for this, growth in 2004 and 2005 would be 7.7% and 6.1%,
respectively. 
5
According to the CSO labour force survey. * In 2004 the leap-year effect may have caused an upward distortion of some 0.2 percentage points
in GDP, i.e. instead of the 4.0 headline GDP growth, the underlying figure adjusted for calendar effects was probably around 3.8 per cent. In 2005, the dis-
tortion  is to the negative direction. Our 3.5 per cent growth projection is consistent with the underlying 3.8 per cent growth estimated for 2004. ** The range
indicates the uncertainty in the application of the ESA methodology in Hungary *** Assumption, based on the 0.6 per cent deficit reduction target in the
Convergence Programme of the Government, relative to our 2005 projection. 
22
Unless otherwise indicated, our projection is based on information and data received before 17 May 2005.
2004 2005 2006
Actual/ Projection
Estimate
Febr. Current Febr. Current
Consumer price index (CPI)
December 5.5 3.6 3.3 3.4 3.2
Annual average 6.8 3.4 3.3 3.8 3.4
Economic growth
External demand (GDP-based) 1.8 1.9 1.5 2.3 2.2
Household consumption 2.8 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.8
Memo: Household consumption expenditure 3.5 2.7 2.7 2.4 3.0
Fixed capital formation 8.3 4.5 4.5 4.3 5.2
Domestic absorption 3.3 2.2 3.1 3.0 3.4
Exports 15.7 12.1 8.5 10.3 9.6
Imports 14.0 9.7 7.7 9.3 9.0
GDP 3.8 (4.0)* 3.8 3.5 (3.3)* 3.6 3.6
Current account deficit
As a percentage of GDP 8.9 8.7 8.6 8.0 8.2
EUR billions 7.1 7.7 7.5 7.6 7.6
External financing requirement
As a percentage of GDP 8.5 8.0 8.0 7.2 7.4
General government
Cash based (GFS) deficit 6.5 5.5 5.6 4.5 n/a
ESA deficit 5.4-6.0** 5.3 5.0-5.8** 4.7 *** 4.4-5.2***
Deficit according to national definition
1
4.5-5.1** 4.4 3.9-4.7** n/a n/a
Augmented SNA deficit
2
8.1 8.3 8.5 n/a n/a
Demand impact
3
-0.3 0.1 0.1 n/a n/a
Labour market
National economy gross earnings
4
6.1 8.9 8.4 6.5 6.3
National economy employment
5
-0.5 -0.1 -0.5 0.5 0.5
Private sector gross average earnings 9.3 7.8 7.0 7.1 6.6
Private sector employment
5
-0.3 0.4 -0.1 0.7 0.8
Private sector unit labour cost 3.1 4.2 2.9 2.6 1.8
Household real income 4.0 3.7 3.4 2.8 2.7
In February we projected a strongly decreasing
inflation path, which has been confirmed by the
recently published data and latest information.
Accordingly, we have revised our projection only
slightly, reducing it by 0.3 percentage point for
December 2005 and by 0.2 percentage point for
December 2006. This modification is basically the
result of our reduced core inflation projection.
Our core inflation projection was reduced
because in light of the latest data and information
we now consider a larger part of the factors that
caused last year’s disinflation to be lasting in
nature as compared to the time of compiling our
February projection. On the supply side, what
basically determines the persistence of disinflation
is whether the labour market adapts itself to the
exchange rate that appreciated during last year
and has been stable since then and to the lower
inflation environment. According to our analysis
carried out on the basis of the latest available
data, the growth rate of wages and unit labour
cost has continuously been declining in the private
sector since the middle of last year, and by end
2005 is projected to decline to a level consistent
with price stability. Relative to our February pro-
jection, in this Report our forecast regarding the
increase in wages and unit labour costs of the pri-
vate sector in 2005 and 2006 has been cut by
around 1 percentage point. If companies restrain
their wage increases, this may drive the whole
economy to a permanently lower nominal path,
since their costs will be in conformity with a lower
rate of sales price increase.
In addition to the supply side, demand factors also
support a core inflation projection moderately
lower than the previous one, since, according to
our projection, aggregate demand in 2005 will be
lower than forecast in February, which is also
shown by the reduction in the GDP projection.
Lower household and corporate inflation expecta-
tions also support the reduction of our current core
inflation projection relative to the February fore-
cast.
In addition to the above described adjustment
process there may have been another important
factor underlying the actual 2005 Q1 core inflation
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Table 4.2
Differences between the current and February 2005 inflation projections*
(Percentage points)
Actual Projection
Weight 2005 2005 2005 2005 2006 2006 2006 2006
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Unprocessed food 5.9 1.9 4.0 1.6 –1.1 2.6 1.7 0.4 2.0
Motor fuels and 6.2 –0.3 3.3 4.7 5.2 5.6 2.1 0.7 –0.3
market-priced energy
Regulated prices 20.3 –0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 –0.1
Core inflation** 67.6 –0.2 –0.4 –0.6 –0.9 –1.1 –1.1 –0.8 –0.4
CPI 100.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 –0.4 –0.1 –0.4 –0.4 –0.2
* Negative values indicate if our current projection for the given item is lower than the one of February.
** For technical reasons, the core inflation published by the CSO may be different from the similar indicator used by the MNB for analysis and forecast-
ing. In 2005 Q1, the index used by us was 0.2 percentage point higher than the one published by the CSO.
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data, which was lower relative to our February pro-
jection. This factor is the intensifying (import) com-
petition, which is reflected both in the widening
range of imported products and in the growing
number of economic agents entering the market,
which may have been bolstered by EU accession
as well.
23
This effect may especially be consider-
able in the case of processed food and alcoholic
beverages, which is confirmed by background
conversations with experts from these industries.
Nevertheless, the change in our main scenario rel-
ative to February contributed to an increase in our
inflation projection. Although industrial goods and
food inflation of the euro area was somewhat lower
in 2005 Q1 than the multi-year average, the USD
oil price trend assumption in the current projection
is approximately 20 and 30 per cent higher for
2005 and 2006, respectively, than it was in the
February projection, i.e. our assumption regarding
future imported inflation justified a higher inflation
projection. Moreover, the assumed stronger dollar
and weaker forint exchange rate against the euro
also contribute to higher inflation.
In addition, we have raised our projection regard-
ing the inflation of unprocessed food, which is
basically attributable to the upward modification of
our assumption of the producer price of pork.
4. 1. 1 Impact of an alternative 
interest rate and exchange rate 
assumption on our projection
In the following, we briefly present the impact on
our projections for inflation and economic growth if
the averages of interest rate and exchange rate
expectations of market analysts and research
institutions participating in the Reuters survey
were used in our calculations, instead of the inte-
rest rate and exchange rate assumptions deriving
from our rules.
We prepared our main scenario under the
assumption of a 7.5 per cent short-term interest
23
See details in Section 4.7.
Table 4.3
Changes in the major assumptions relative to February* 
2005 February Current Change
projection projection (percentage)
2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006
Central bank base rate 9.0 9.0 7.5 7.5 –1.5*** –1.5***
(per cent)**
5-year yield (per cent)** 8.5 8.5 7.0 7.0 –1.5*** –1.5***
EUR/HUF exchange rate 246.6 246.6 247.4 248.2 0.3 0.6
EUR/USD exchange rate 131.3 131.3 129.9 129.5 –1.1 –1.4
(US cents)
Brent oil price (USD/barrel) 43.7 40.9 52.6 52.6 20.5 28.7
Memo: Brent oil price 8 198 7 676 10 028 10 087 22.3 31.4
(HUF/barrel)
* Annual averages. Based on 2005 average exchange rates and futures oil prices. ** End-year figures. *** Difference, percentage points.
rate. By contrast, Reuters analysts expect a grad-
ual decline in central bank base rate level and a
6.5 per cent rate at end-2006.
The underlying assumption of our main scenario is
that over the entire projection horizon the EUR/HUF
exchange rate will remain at the April 2005 aver-
age, i.e. 248.2. By contrast, in April, Reuters ana-
lysts predict a continuously depreciating HUF/EUR
exchange rate, which is to be 254.8 at end-2006,
i.e. 2.5 per cent weaker than in April 2005.
If we calculate with the interest rate and exchange
rate paths expected by the Reuters analysts, rela-
tive to our central projection, it would result in an
inflation projection 0.2 and 0.3 percentage point
higher at end-2005 and end-2006, respectively. In
addition, our projection for economic growth in
2006 would also be higher by approximately 0.1
percentage point. The difference between the
central and the above alternative projections is
mainly attributable to the difference between the
exchange rate assumptions.
4. 1. 2 A comparison of our projections
with those of other institutions
24
A comparison of our current projection with the
projections of other bodies (international insti-
tutions, market analysts) reveals that while the
picture of domestic economic growth painted
by us is broadly identical with other analysts’
opinion, we are closer to the lower values of
market expectations in terms of the inflation
outlook.
In terms of equilibrium trends, our projection for
the general government deficit is basically iden-
tical with that of the market, while our projection
for the current account deficit is in the upper
range of the band expected by analysts.
Other analysts tend to consider the size of
Hungary’s export market larger, while their projec-
tions for the GDP growth of Hungary’s trading part-
ners are broadly identical with our projection.
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Chart 4.1
Central bank base rate path based on the April Reuters
survey and the assumption with a constant interest rate
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Chart 4.2
Exchange rate based on the April Reuters survey and
the assumption of a constant exchange rate*
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* Reverse scale.
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Please note that the MNB projections cannot fully be compared to other projections. The projections prepared by the MNB are conditional, while
other institutions usually make unconditional projections. In addition to the difference between the assessment of current and expected trends,
another reason for the divergence between the projections made by the MNB and other institutions may also result from the disparity of our assump-
tions from other institutions’ projections on variables that are exogenous from our perspective.
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2005 2006
Consumer price index  (December on December, per cent)
MNB 3.3 3.2
Reuters survey (April 2005)
1
3.1–3.7–4.2 3.0–3.4–4.0
Consumer price index (average annual increase, per cent)
MNB 3.3 3.4
Consensus Economics (March 2005)
1
2.8–3.6–4.3 2.8–3.6–4.5
European Commission (spring 2005) 3.8 3.6
IMF (April 2005) 4.0 3.8
Reuters survey (April 2005)
1
3.4–3.6–4.0 3.1–3.6–4.2
World Bank (May 2005) 4.0 n/a
GDP (annual growth, per cent)
MNB 3.5 (3.3)** 3.6
Consensus Economics (March 2005)
1
3.2–3.6–4.0 2.4–3.8–4.1
European Commission (spring 2005) 3.9 3.8
IMF (April 2005) 3.7 3.8
Reuters survey (April 2005)
1
3.1–3.6–4.0 3.3–3.8–4.4
World Bank (April 2005) 3.7 n/a
Current account deficit (in EUR billions)
MNB 7.5 7.6
Consensus Economics (March 2005)
1,2
4.0–6.9–8.0 3.6–6.8–8.2
Reuters survey (April 2005)
1
6.7–7.2 –8.2 6.7–7.2–7.8
Current account deficit (as a percentage of GDP)
MNB 8.6 8.2
European Commission (spring 2005) 8.7 8.2
IMF (April 2005) 8.6 8.1
World Bank (April 2005) 8.7 n/a
General government deficit (according to ESA-95, as a percentage of GDP)
MNB 5.0–5.8*** 4.4–5.2***
Consensus Economics (March 2005)
1
4.2–5.0–5.8 3.5–4.6–6.0
European Commission (spring 2005)
4
5.0 5.2
Reuters survey (April 2005)
1
4.9 –5.2–5.5 4.3–4.8–5.2
World Bank (April 2005) 5.1 n/a.
Projections on the size of Hungary’s export market
MNB 5.3 5.7
European Commission (spring 2005)
3
6.2 6.3
IMF (April 2005)
3
6.4 6.9
Projections on the GDP growth rate of Hungary’s trading partners
MNB 1.5 2.2
European Commission (spring 2005)
3
1.6 2.1
IMF (April 2005)
3
1.6 2.2
Table 4.4
MNB’s main scenario versus other projections*
* MNB projections are so-called ‘conditional’ projections. Therefore, they cannot always be directly compared to other projections. ** In 2004, the leap-
year effect may have caused upward distortion of some 0.2 percentage points in GDP, i.e. instead of the 4.0 headline GDP growth, the underlying figure
adjusted for calendar effects was probably around 3.8 per cent. In 2005, the distortion  is to the negative direction. Our 3.5 per cent growth projection is
consistent with the underlying 3.8 per cent growth estimated for 2004.  ***  The range indicates the uncertainty in the application of the ESA methodology
in Hungary. For 2006, an assumption, based on the 0.6 per cent deficit reduction target in the Convergence Programme of the Government, relative to
our 2005 projection.
1
In addition to the averages of polled analysts’ responses (the values in the middle), the smallest and largest values are also indicated in italics for the
Reuters and Consensus Economics surveys in order to illustrate dispersion. 
2
Consensus Economics Inc. (London) ‘Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts’
specifies current account projections in US dollars, therefore they are converted at the EUR/USD exchange rate assumed in the current Report. 
3
Values
calculated by the MNB; the projections of the named institutions regarding individual countries are considered with the weights used for calculating the
MNB’s own external demand indicators. This way, the forecast may differ from the numbers published by the institutions aforesaid. 
4
For the sake of com-
parability the projection of the European Commission was corrected taking into account payments to the private pension fund system.
Source: Consensus Economics Inc. (London) Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts (March 2005); European Commission Economic Forecasts, spring 2005;
IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2005); Reuters survey, April 2005; World Bank EU-8 Quarterly Economic Report (April 2005).
4. 2 Developments in general government deficit indicators
Forecasting fiscal developments is hindered by
greater-than-earlier uncertainties. This is attributa-
ble to the fact that the application of the ESA defi-
cit category in Hungary has not completely been
clarified methodologically, and therefore, due to
the methodological uncertainty, the ESA deficit
cannot be considered informative.
25
As a conse-
quence of the increasing uncertainty surrounding
the predictability of the ESA deficit, our projection
for 2005 illustrates our view of the expected fiscal
path, by mainly presenting the GFS central pro-
jection and the so-called augmented (SNA) deficit.
Within this, we consider the developments in the
augmented type, SNA deficit category to be a fis-
cal indicator which reflects changes in fiscal
developments over time in a well interpretable
manner for monetary policy. The reason is that this
indicator includes even those items in government
spending that do not belong to the government
according to official statistics, but are realised on
government initiative or involve long-term commit-
ment by the government to spend.
In our projection for 2005, compared to last year,
a decline in the GFS deficit to 5.6 per cent of the
GDP, i.e. by 1 per cent, is expected. However, this
will mainly be realised by outsourcing government
investments’ i.e. via an increase in quasi-fiscal
expenditure. Therefore, relative to last year, the
68
25
The ESA deficit of individual years changed significantly several times for methodological reasons. This is shown in the changes for the year 2003
ESA deficit. Last year the year 2003 ESA deficit amounted to 5.9 per cent first, then later it was modified to 6.2 per cent. However, in March 2005
Eurostat published a deficit 7.2 per cent of the GDP because of the change in the methodology of VAT recording. The recognition of the losses of
MÁV (the state railway company), the recording of the national part of agricultural subsidies according to ESA etc. are still pending matters.
Table 4.5
Fiscal indicators according to our baseline scenario
(As a percentage of GDP)
Actual/Estimate Projection
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1) GFS deficit -3.0 -10.1 -5.9 -6.5 -5.6
2) Adjustment of the interest balance 
according to ESA -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.3
3) Other corrections on ESA basis -1.0 +0.9 -1.3 (+1.3)-(+0.7) (+0.9)-(+0.1)
4) ESA deficit (1+2+3) -4.4 -9.2 -7.2 (-5.4)-(-6.0) (-5.0)-(-5.8)
5) Deficit according to national definition* -3.7 -8.5 -6.2 (-4.5)-(-5.1) (-3.9)-(-4.7)
6) Quasi-fiscal expenditure and other adjustments -2.3 +1.3 -2.6 -1.6 -2.9
7) Augmented (SNA) deficit** (1+6) -5.3 -8.8 -8.5 -8.1 -8.5
8) Augmented (SNA) primary balance -0.6 -4.9 -4.6 -4.2 -4.4
9) Fiscal demand impact*** +1.8 +4.2 -0.4 -0.3 +0.1
* Modification of the ESA deficit taking account of the revenue and expenditure of private pension funds, based on the statistical corrections in the EDP
report sent to Eurostat in March 2005. The extent of the correction is different from the one in the previous Report. ** Cash based deficit of the general
government excluding certain extraordinary revenue and expenditure, and including the balance from quasi-fiscal activities recorded outside the gener-
al government. *** Calculated from the so-called augmented (SNA) type indicator; negative values denote contraction in aggregate demand.
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augmented (SNA-type) balance which also
includes this expenditure will not improve. On the
contrary, as our 8.5 per cent estimation suggests,
it will slightly deteriorate this year, and thus our
demand effect indicator does not signal contrac-
tion for 2005 either.
Our new projection for 2005 relative to the
February one has remained broadly unchanged
as far as the above indicators are concerned.
Meanwhile, in the light of Q1 actual data we per-
ceive increasing risks on the expenditure side of
the government budget. The risk of failing to attain
the target of ESA deficit reduction in 2006 has also
increased, as additional determinants have
appeared on the expenditure side since our previ-
ous projection.
Year 2004 deficit
In our February Report, a 5.3 per cent GDP-pro-
portionate ESA deficit was estimated for 2004.
When the 2004 ESA deficit was estimated in
February, it was unknown whether the CSO would
determine 2004 net revenue from VAT according
to the ESA methodology applied in previous years,
or if there would be a change in methodology.
Therefore, the February Report was based on the
assumption that one part of the VAT refunds not
paid back in 2004 would be recorded in the 2004
ESA deficit and the other part in the 2005 ESA de-
ficit. In February, the CSO made a methodological
change in recording the VAT revenues; they
switched to complete accrual accounting (based
on individual receipts), which resulted in a subse-
quent adjustment of the 2003 ESA deficit to -7.2
per cent from the -6.2 per cent approved last year.
According to accrual VAT accounting the prelimi-
nary 2004 ESA deficit changed to 5.4 per cent.
However, this was rather the start than the end of
the process of finalising the actual 2004 ESA fig-
ures. Eurostat is expected to publish the latest
data in September, in possession of the final defi-
cit of the local governments sub-sector and
including statistical adjustments consistent with
national accounts compiled by the CSO and also
the corrections deriving from decisions on the cur-
rently pending methodological issues. Based on
past experience, an upward revision of the ESA
deficit is possible, and this is the reason why a rel-
atively wide, 5.4–6.0 per cent GDP-proportionate
range was given for the year 2004 nowcasting.
The preliminary actual figure of the 2004 GFS defi-
cit is 6.5 per cent, which would have been around
7.0 per cent, if VAT refunds had not been delayed
by the Tax and Financial Control Administration in
2004 H2. The so-called augmented (SNA) deficit
category indicates a nearly 0.5 percentage point
decline in the deficit (from -8.5 per cent to -8.1 per
cent) relative to 2003, basically as a result of the
decline in quasi-fiscal expenditure (which has
proven to be temporary in the meantime).
Fiscal balance expected for 2005
According to our central projection the 2005 ESA
deficit target of 4.7 per cent is not expected to be
achieved, unless further balance-improving meas-
ures are taken during the year. Without such
measures, the ESA deficit in proportion to the GDP
is expected to be in the range of 5.0–5.8 per cent
Chart 4.3.
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this year, while the GFS deficit is to be around 5.6
per cent according to our central projection.
While our GFS deficit projection is declining from last
year’s 6.5 per cent by 1.0 per cent to 5.6 per cent,
our so-called augmented SNA deficit estimation
shows a slight increase (from 8.1 per cent to 8.5 per
cent). These changes in different directions result
from the fact that relative to last year government
expenditures that were excluded from the GFS and
ESA deficit categories have increased considerably.
As usual, our 2005 central projection is based on
several important assumptions:
• As for primary expenditure, except for open-ended
ones, expenditure appropriations specified by law
were assumed to be realised.
• As for the developments in wages and salaries
in the public sector, we calculated using the wage
growth specified by the Budget Act; in 2005 on
general government level it represents an approx-
imately 7–8 per cent gross average wage growth.
• We assumed the definitive freezing of the HUF
100 billion expenditure reserve set aside by the
Budget Act and of the additional HUF 60 billion
expenditure reserve created by the government in
its own competence this spring.
26
• Our projection for the interest balance is based
on the 2 May forward yield curve.
In terms of the magnitude of the deficit, our central
projection of the GFS deficit has remained broadly
unchanged relative to our February central project-
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In our central projection of the cash based (GFS) deficit, of the central budget appropriations we calculated with the definitive withdrawal of the
so-called blocked expenditure reserves specified by the Budget Act and increased by HUF 60 billion by the government later. The method of recog-
nition is identical with the one applied in our February Report except that at that time blocking of the additional expenditure was not on the agen-
da, so then we could not calculate with that.
Table 4.6
Differences between our 2005 projection and the approved budgetary estimates
(including additional measures approved later, cash based, as a percentage of GDP)
Divergence from appropriations specified by law***
I. Revenues –0,6
Of which: direct taxes –0,3
Of which: indirect taxes –0,7
Effect of VAT refund from 2004* –0,6
II. Primary expenditure +0,1
Of which: open-ended expenditure +0,2
Of which: local governments +0,3
Of which: blocking of expenditure reserve** –0,6
III. Primary balance (I-II) –0,7
1) Interest balance –0,1
2) Current-price GDP difference –0,1
Differences total (III+1+2)*** –0,8
* Within our central projection of indirect taxes we calculated with the cash based payment in 2005 of the total amount of VAT refunds carried over from
last year. ** In the projection we assumed that the accumulation of expenditure reserves will be 100 per cent effective.  Ceteris paribus, this assumption
decreases the expenditure side compared to the original budget.*** Due to rounding, items do not always add up correctly.
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ion. The underlying reason is that our central pro-
jection of direct and indirect taxes moved towards
lower revenues and our projection of open-ended
expenditure became higher, while our nominal GDP
projection declined relative to February.
As for the tax categories which determine the ma-
in budget revenues, in 2005 on cash basis we
expect revenue to be lower by nearly 1.0 per cent
of GDP compared to the revenue specified in the
Budget Act. Our projection of revenues from cor-
porate income tax and simplified entrepreneurial
tax has remained broadly unchanged relative to
our February projection (we calculate with higher
tax revenues from both taxes than the estimate
specified by law). However, our central projection
of personal income tax and excise duties shifted
towards lower revenues relative to February,
mainly due to changes in our macroeconomic
forecast.
On the expenditure side, with respect to all expen-
diture items under the control of the Ministry of
Finance, as earlier we accepted that these budg-
et appropriations will be achievable (it is also
assumed that the Government will be able to carry
out the definitive withdrawal of the blocked expen-
diture appropriations).
We have prepared our own projection of open-
ended expenditures; our forecast for pension and
pharmaceutical expenditures together includes
higher expenditure than the statutory appropria-
tions by 0.15 percentage points of GDP. This dif-
ference is mainly attributable to base effects.
Our interest balance projection was prepared
using the forward yield curve fixed on 2 May,
and it is based on the updated financing plan of
the Government Debt Management Agency.
According to our calculations, the cash based in-
terest balance of the budget may only slightly
exceed the statutory appropriation (by less than
0.1 percentage point of GDP).
On the basis of the GFS deficit central projection,
we prepared an estimate for the expected devel-
opments in the SNA-type deficit indicator. The so-
called augmented (SNA) deficit indicator, which
as mentioned above also includes quasi-fiscal
expenditure, forecasts an increase in the deficit
level in 2005 relative to 2004. This is mainly
caused by the acceleration of highway construc-
tions and the upturn in PPP investments.
According to our estimate for the fiscal demand
effect, the budget is to have a broading neutral
effect on aggregate demand this year. This means
that if the extension of the highway network and
other quasi-fiscal expenditures are interpreted as
government spending, then, according to our esti-
mation, in 2005 there will be no fiscal adjustment
in terms of general government in a broader
sense.
Uncertainty of the 2005 deficit forecast
All risk factors that may be seen from
autonomous economic and fiscal developments
are summarised below. There is an asymmetric
perception of the spread of risks, towards a
2005 cash based deficit which is higher than the
central projection. As it is illustrated by the table
below, if conditions turn unfavourable, the cash
based deficit may substantially exceed 6.0 per
cent of the GDP by the end of the year.
Amongst the risks pointing to a higher deficit
level, risks related to the measures taken to
reduce budget expenditure may be underlined.
Of the annual expenditure estimates of budget
chapters, budgetary institutions and so-called
‘special appropriations’ nearly HUF 140 billion of
appropriations was frozen by the government.
This measure may result in tensions in this area,
because spending is limited not only by the
blocking of expenditure, but also by the regula-
tion regarding this year’s carry-over funds.
According to this regulation, carry-over funds from
last year cannot be at a lower level at end-2005
than at the beginning of the year. This measure
applies to the central budget as a whole, and it
may generate tensions that the measure cannot
likely be realised in the case of some ministries
and special appropriations. Therefore, it may hap-
pen that certain ministries and budgetary institu-
tions would have to increase their year-end carry-
over funds for a full compliance with the relevant
legal provision vis-à-vis the whole budget.
Amongst the risks pointing to a lower deficit, in
case of the main tax categories a possible higher
outcome for the tax revenues indicated in our cen-
tral projection needs to be underlined. The risk of
surplus tax revenues may mainly arise in case of
corporate and personal income taxes, especially if
last December’s increase in corporate tax pay-
ments is repeated at the end of this year.
Planned deficit reduction for 2006 and its 
uncertainty
As there is no approved budget or detailed budg-
et bill for 2006, and the uncertainties surrounding
our 2005 ESA deficit projection are also significant,
we are not preparing any point estimate for the ESA
deficit for 2006.
For 2006 we still assume that as declared by the
Government in last December’s Convergence
Programme, at the ESA deficit level the annual 0.6
percentage point GDP-proportionate decline in de-
ficit will be achieved. However, lowering the deficit
level will require the realisation of additional new
measures. This is illustrated by the table below,
where the effects of the year 2006 determinants are
expressed in figures.
Determinants known and quantified by us indicate
the necessity of an additional fiscal balance improv-
ing measure in 2006, amounting to 2.4 per cent of
GDP. Our calculation is based on the assumption
that in the areas not affected by the determinants
the increase in tax revenues and expenditure rela-
tive to GDP will remain unchanged next year. As we
have no official information on the timing of the final
termination of the lump sum health care contribu-
tion, in accordance with our projection rules we
assumed the termination of this tax category start-
ing from the beginning of the year.
On the one hand, determinants include the phasing
out of 2005 extraordinary revenues, and on the
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Central projection of GFS deficit: -5.6 per cent
Direct and indirect tax revenues will be higher +0.4 Tax revenues will fall behind those –0.4
than those assumed in the central projection in the central projection
EU subsidies co-financing will be +0.1 Measures taken to reduce spending –0.4
lower than planned will only partly be effective
Local governments’ cash based deficit +0.1 Investment spending of local governments –0.1
will be lower will exceed expectations
Higher than expected increase in open-ended –0.1
expenditure
Impact of favourable developments on the balance +0.6 Impact of unfavourable developments on the balance –1.0
GFS deficit in the favourable case –5.0 GFS deficit in the unfavourable case –6.6
Table 4.7
Major factors of uncertainty in the GFS deficit projection for 2005
(As a percentage of GDP)
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other hand, they quantify the lasting effects of the
already announced measures to be taken by the
Government. Selling the already built highway
sections and MOL’s extraordinary payment to the
gas compensation fund constitute one-off rev-
enues that improve the 2005 deficit level. The can-
cellation of the lump sum health care contribution
(we assumed the termination of this tax from the
beginning of the year), payment of the entire 13th-
month pension and the indexation of pensions
constitute a determinant with lasting effect.In
terms of the GFS balance, we expect an addition-
al increase in investment spending by the central
budget amounting to approximately 0.5 per cent
of GDP, owing to an agreement concluded with
the European Union on investment expenditure.
27
According to our calculations, if the appropriations
are attained, the level of investments does not
allow the fulfilment of the aforementioned agree-
ment in 2005. Therefore, as we estimate, relative to
this year, extra investment expenditure amounting
to at least around 0.5 per cent of GDP will need to
be appropriated on the expenditure side of the
2006 budget.
28
As meeting NATO obligations has been ineffective
in recent years, the meeting of earlier undertaken
GDP-proportionate cash based expenditure obli-
gations was not assumed. Nevertheless, we
assumed a lump-sum recording of the Gripen
fighter plane procurement for 2006, in line with the
methodology applied for the balance of payment.
29
From 2006 on there will be a new expenditure
appropriation related to the highway construction
scheme; this is called ‘for availability payment obli-
gation’, which is estimated to amount to 0.3 per
cent of GDP.
Table 4.8
Effect of quantifiable determinants*
(As a percentage of GDP)
1 2 1-2
Effect of determinants Assumption Risk not yet covered 
by measures
Change in ESA balance ** –1.8 +0.6 –2.4
*A positive number denotes an improvement (deficit reduction) in the balance. ** Relative to the balance in 2005.
27
Pursuant to the agreement, in the specified sectors (environmental protection, transportation etc.) Hungary must achieve the minimum level
required as expenditures relative to GDP on the average of three years. The purpose of the agreement is to ensure that, rather than relying on EU
funds or reducing their expenditure to perform budget adjustment, the new Member States actually use the available extra EU resources as addi-
tional sources for programmes.
28
When our calculation was prepared, it was unknown to what extent the blocking of expenditure reserves may affect investment appropriations.
As our central projection of the 2005 cash based deficit assumes the definitive blocking of the expenditure reserve, our estimation for this determinant
is to be considered as lower estimate.
29
Section 4.9 contains more details on this issue.
The current account deficit was EUR 1.7 billion in
2004 Q4, while the surplus in the capital account
balance amounted to EUR 130 million. The
assessment of external financial developments is
rendered very difficult by the fact that prior to EU
accession the corporate sector increased its
imports and made significant inventory invest-
ments in goods with a higher import burden within
the EU. Consequently, imports grew faster in 2004
Q1 and then slower than could be expected
based on fundamental developments. The sea-
sonally adjusted GDP-proportionate external
financing requirement adjusted for the above
effect amounted to 7.2 per cent in Q4, which con-
stitutes a considerable, approximately 3 percent-
age point decline relative to Q3. The significant
improvement in the external balance is mainly
attributable to the (presumably temporary) con-
tractionary effect of the fiscal policy. On the other
hand, the Q4 real economy balance improvement
is attributable to the considerably slower increase
in the corporate sector’s investment demand on
the short base, which is most probably also a tem-
porary phenomenon, improving the external bal-
ance only in the short run.
The seasonally adjusted accrual based financing
requirement of the general government (public
sector) declined to 7.2 per cent of GDP in Q4. The
spectacular decline in the deficit is mainly a result
of temporary deficit reduction measures, such as
the postponement to January 2005 of the payment
of civil servants’ 13th-month salaries. In addition,
the government imposed serious restrictions on
current expenditure and investment spending of
budgetary institutions. The Q1 cash based deficit
data available in 2005 suggest that in 2005 Q1 the
public sector’s seasonally adjusted financing
requirement returned to its earlier level.
The increase in households’ seasonally adjusted
net financial savings slowed continuously during
the year. In Q4, simultaneously with the modest
decline in asset expansion and borrowing, the
seasonally adjusted GDP-proportionate net
financing capacity remained at 2 per cent.
4. 3 Developments in external balance
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Table 4.9
Current account and financing by sectors 
(As a percentage of GDP)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Estimate Forecast
I. General government –5.2 –8.9 –8.5 –8.4 –8.8 –8.2
II. Private sector (=1+2) –0.4 2.0 –0.3 –0.1 0.8 0.8
1. Households 5.2 2.6 0.1 1.9 2.7 2.8
2. Corporate sector –5.6 –0.7 –0.4 –1.9 –1.9 –2.0
External financing capacity (=I+II) –5.6 –6.9 –8.7 –8.5 –8.0 –7.4
Current account balance –6.3 –7.2 –8.7 –8.9 –8.6 –8.2
– EUR billions –3.6 –5.0 –6.4 –7.1 –7.5 –7.6
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The corporate sector’s behaviour was examined
on an accrual basis, similarly to that of the gener-
al government, allowing for the distortion effect of
the imports brought forward due to EU accession.
The sector’s seasonally adjusted GDP-proportion-
ate financing requirement decreased consider-
ably in Q4. The decline in the corporate sector’s
financing requirement occurred in parallel with the
significant slowdown in the increase of investment
spending relative to Q3. In addition to other fac-
tors, the slower increase in investments may also
be related to the lower-than-usual VAT refunds,
which are due to the tax audits; companies with
liquidity constraints were compelled to postpone
their investments.
The 2004 current account deficit grew to EUR 7.12
billion. At the same time, as a result of the surplus
on the capital account, the country’s GDP-propor-
tionate external financing requirement declined by
0.2 percentage point to 8.5 per cent.
30
The moder-
ation in the external financing requirement was in
parallel with the slight decline in the government
and private sectors’ financing requirement.
Although there has been no significant improve-
ment in the external imbalance, the structure of
financing has shifted in a favourable direction in
terms of risk perception. The ratio of non-debt
generating financing increased to 55 per cent
from the low of 10 per cent in 2003.
In 2005, the government sector’s GDP-proportion-
ate financing requirement may slightly increase.
With the slowing expansion of capital expenditure,
the GDP-proportionate net financing requirement
of the corporate sector is not expected to grow fur-
ther, while households’ net financial savings may
slightly increase. The GDP-proportionate external
financing requirement is likely to fall by 0.5 per-
centage point, which means an increase of the
current account deficit to EUR 7.5 billion in paral-
lel with a rise in the surplus of the capital account.
In 2006, a precondition for the decline in the exter-
nal financing requirement is a restrictive fiscal pol-
icy on the level of the entire general government,
while the GDP-proportionate financing capacity of
the private sector is expected to remain
unchanged.
Table 4.10
Structure of the current account
(As a percentage of GDP)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Actual Projection
1. External balance of goods and services –1.5 –2.4 –4.5 –3.0 –3.2 –2.7
2.  Income balance –5.5 –5.6 –5.0 –6.1 –5.8 –5.9
3. Balance of current transfers 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.4 0.4
I. Current account balance (1+2+3) –6.2 –7.2 –8.7 –8.9 –8.6 –8.2
II. Capital account balance 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8
External financing capacity (I+II) –5.6 –6.9 –8.7 –8.5 –8.0 –7.4
30
At the time of the EU accession the goods of community origin in customs warehouses were recorded as imports. This one-off effect increased
the current account deficit and the external financing requirement by 0.5 per cent of GDP in 2004.
The GDP-proportionate current account deficit
remained roughly unchanged in 2004, as a joint
result of a significant decrease in the deficit of the
external balance of goods and services and a mo-
re than 1 percentage point deterioration in the
income balance. The decrease in the deficit of net
exports stemmed from a considerable increase in
export growth and a substantial slowdown in the
growth rate of domestic use  – this decrease was
especially large in final consumption of house-
holds. The deterioration of the income balance is
mainly due to the continuing indebtedness and the
increasing interest rates. Because of the lower in-
terest rates and a fiscal deficit financed by more in
foreign exchange, the deficit of the income bal-
ance in 2005 is expected to remain at the level of
the previous year. Therefore, the deficit of the cur-
rent account may remain at the level seen in the
last two years.
4. 3. 1 Financing the current account
deficit
In terms of risk perception, the structure of financ-
ing was more favourable in 2004 Q4 than in H1,
while the ratio of non-debt generating net financ-
ing edged down to 65 per cent following an
increase to 84 per cent in Q3. Following the
exceptionally high inflow in Q3, the value of foreign
direct investment fell significantly in Q4. The main
underlying cause of the drop in FDI inflows was
that a company’s foreign large investors sold their
block of shares in a Hungarian company to foreign
small investors, which resulted in a rearrangement
of FDI and share inflows. Therefore, in Q4 there
was a marked increase in non-residents’ stock
portfolio. Overall, in view of the above influences,
the non-debt generating capital inflow remained at
the Q3 level. At the same time, the non-debt gen-
erating capital outflow increased, resulting in a
nearly EUR 400 million decline in net non-debt
generating financing.
Within debt financing, following an upswing in Q3,
non-residents’ demand for government securities
was practically zero. The increase in the sector’s
net forint deposits also fell behind the level regis-
tered in Q3. At the same time, along with a mod-
erate increase in spot forint exposure, non-resi-
dents reduced their swap holdings against the fo-
rint, although it resulted in an increase of only EUR
330 million in their total forint position. In parallel
with the considerable FDI inflow, the corporate
sector’s net external debt continued to decline.
Following the fall in Q3, banks’ foreign currency
borrowing grew to nearly EUR 1 billion, due main-
ly to foreign currency lending to households.
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Chart 4.4
(Composition of financing)
As a percentage of GDP
—6
—4
—2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Per cent
—6
—4
—2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Per cent
The net change of foreign 
debt of the corporate sector
The net change of banks 
external debt (bonds, loans)
Net lending of general 
government
Net purchase of shares 
of non-residents
The net growth of government
securities and mortgage bonds
owned by non-residents
Net FDI
External borrowing 
requirement
Special topics
77
Table 4.11
External financing requirement
(EUR millions)
2003 2003 2004 2004
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
1. External financing requirement -1645 -1771 -1317 -1663 -6396 -1371 -2172 -1681 -1582 -6806
1.1 Current account balance -1554 -1780 -1329 -1701 -6364 -1308 -2253 -1851 -1712 -7123
1.2 Capital account balance -91 9 12 38 -32 -63 81 170 130 318
2. Financing 4331 160 1515 923 6929 1238 2574 1648 2874 8334
2.1 Direct investments -209 252 -52 452 443 409 483 1324 724 2940
2.1.1 Direct investments abroad -485 -162 -62 -756 -1466 -252 -99 44 -117 -424
2.1.2 Direct investments in Hungary 276 413 11 1208 1909 661 582 1280 841 3365
2.2 Borrowing by consolidated 1563 -208 1166 -136 2385 905 74 1353 1541 3873
general government
2.2.1 Borrowing from the MNB -116 -541 -771 -421 -1849 -738 -25 -61 -26 -848
2.2.2 Borrowing by the Government 951 70 1076 415 2512 861 691 450 1579 3581
(excluding securities issue)
2.2.3 Purchases of government 728 264 861 -130 1722 781 -592 964 -12 1141
securities by non-residents
2.3 Net borrowing by private sector 2932 36 338 578 3884 50 1960 -963 514 1560
2.3.1 Borrowing by credit institutions 2642 -168 390 349 3214 314 1939 106 928 3288
2.3.2 Portfolio investments (shares) 208 39 148 -173 223 326 98 95 314 833
2.3.3 Net borrowing by 82 165 -200 402 448 -590 -78 -1164 -729 -2561
companies abroad
2.4 Balance of errors and omissions 45 80 62 29 216 -126 57 -66 95 -40
3. Change in international reserves (1+2) 2686 -1611 198 -740 532 -133 402 -32 1292 1528
Assessments of the performance of the MNB’s
inflation projections have been published on sev-
eral occasions.
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Starting from this issue, our
analysis will also extend to our projections related
to growth (i.e. GDP).
In contrast, for instance, with the CPI, the regular
revisions pertaining to the provision of statistical
data may cause difficulties in our GDP projections,
as in this case it is not clear if our projections are
to be compared with the data provided for the first
time or the revised final data.
32
This analysis relies
on the latter solution, even though in some cases
subsequent revisions have significantly modified
the time series of the period under review.
Naturally, in addition to the subsequent calculation
of projection errors, in many cases such revisions
may even bias the projections (as they overwrite
the factual time series that provide the basis of our
projections).
The Magyar Nemzeti Bank has been publishing
projections since August 2001. A statistical analy-
sis of GDP projections and the facts leads to the
conclusion that the differences between our pro-
jections on GDP growth rates and the relevant
facts statistically do not differ from zero, thus no
significant under- or overestimations can be seen
on any time horizon in the past three years.
Simultaneously, it is noticeable that over short time
horizons positive and negative errors almost com-
pletely neutralise one another, whereas over the
longer term the projections exceeding subsequent
facts are in a slight majority.
If our projections for the individual years are eval-
uated separately, our projections for 2002 roughly
correspond to the facts, while growth is overesti-
mated in the 2003 and underestimated in the 2004
projections, primarily over the longer terms. The
essential difference between the two years lies in
the reason for the major part of deviations: while
for 2003, they result from our projections regard-
ing external economic developments, which sub-
sequently proved to be over-optimistic, with
regard to 2004, they can be explained by an
unforeseen negative supply shock (the indirect tax
hike in early 2004).
It is worth comparing the performance of our GDP
projections with that of other analysts. As shown
for consumer inflation projections, professional
analysts’ GDP projections may provide a natural
basis of comparison.
33
Before detailing the results, it is worth recalling the
factors that may set limits to comparison. The most
important one is the fact that the projections pre-
4. 4 Assessment of the performance of the MNB’s growth
projections
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See Section 5.1 in the February 2004 and Section 4.4 in the February 2005 issues of the Report on Inflation.
32
Revisions of the domestic GDP data are described in Section 5.2 in the November 2002 issue of the Report on Inflation.
33
See section 4.4. in the 2004 February Report.
Chart 4.5
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pared by market analysts and researchers are
characteristically unconditional, meaning that they
are made on the basis of the widest available set of
information. By contrast, central bank projections
are conditional, i.e. the central bank applies techni-
cal assumptions for certain macroeconomic vari-
ables (e.g. exchange rates, interest rates, certain
fiscal variables, etc.), and thus such projections are
valid only in excess of a limited set of information.
The evaluation of these analyses is even more dif-
ficult because instead of checking our results
against individual analysts’ projections separately,
they are compared to the consensus (average or
median) of projections by other analysts. The big-
ger the sample used for comparison, the more this
fact may reduce the error of consensus projection
(as positive and negative errors are more likely to
offset one another).
On the basis of these considerations, our project-
ion performance may be deemed as more accu-
rate for 2002 and 2003 GDP: our projections devi-
ate less than the average of projections by profes-
sional analysts. With regard to the 2004 growth
rate, our projection may be given two different
evaluations: errors in our projections made for
longer periods (6-8 quarters) exceed the analysts’
consensus, whereas over shorter horizons the two
are of equal orders of magnitude.
Performance of our projections for 2004 growth and
inflation – a simultaneous analysis
The official announcement of indirect tax hikes
markedly divided our 2004 projections into two
distinct parts. Prior to the announcement, our
view of the growth prospects basically corre-
sponded to the subsequently realised GDP
growth, however, consumer inflation in the same
period was significantly underestimated because
indirect tax hikes had not been taken into con-
sideration. Following announcement of the tax
hikes, the expected inflationary effects were
Table 4.12
Statistical indicators characterising deviations of GDP projections from the actual data*
(Percentage points; deviation = projection – actual)
Mean error Mean absolute error Root mean square error
(ME) (MAE) (RMSE)
For 1-4 quarters ahead 0,04 0.34 0.43
For 5-8 quarters ahead 0.29 0.87 0.99
* The mean error (ME) represents the arithmetic average of differences between our projections and the facts. As all values included in the indicator have
equal weight, a positive indicator denotes the preponderance of characteristically higher, and a negative one of characteristically lower projections. The
mean absolute error (MAE) is calculated similarly to the mean error, but in this case every difference is interpreted as an absolute value. The root mean
square error is an average of the squares of differences from the facts, from which the root square of the entire indicator is calculated. For this reason,
irrespective of its sign, this indicator ‘punishes’ bigger differences from facts to a greater extent than previous indicators.
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immediately incorporated into our projection.
Primary effects were included in an extent actu-
ally corresponding to the facts. Consequently,
errors in our released CPI projections decreased
considerably.
34
Simultaneously, the errors in our GDP projections
suddenly rose and only gradually returned to their
normal course. The increase in the projection error
in the August 2003 Report was clearly due to the
modification of our projection on household con-
sumption. A major revision of our projection was
required by a massive slowdown in household real
income caused by the secondary effects of the
announced indirect tax hikes on labour markets
and the expected fiscal tightening. In our subse-
quent projections, we gradually modified our view
of household behaviour towards a more precise
assumption, however, our GDP projection
remained underestimated. The reason why we
projected slightly slower growth than actually
achieved in this period was our overestimation of
the influence of the decelerating international bu-
siness cycle on Hungarian economic growth
through net exports.
Thus, taking everything into consideration, it may
be established that compared to the consensus of
professional analysts, our GDP projections for
2002 and 2003 perform satisfactorily, whereas the
errors of our longer-term projections for 2004
growth exceed the errors in the analysts’ consen-
sus taken for reference. The reason for a larger
projection error over this time horizon lies for the
most part in our assessment of the uncertainty over
the secondary effects of the indirect tax hikes.
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Chart 4.7
Errors in our projections for 2004 GDP growth and
average consumer inflation
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Section 4.4 in the February 2004 issue of the Report on Inflation gives a more detailed evaluation.
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According to the latest Labour Force Survey con-
ducted by the CSO, in 2005 Q1 the rate of unem-
ployment rose to 7.1 per cent from 6.1 per cent on
a year earlier. Nevertheless, the Hungarian unem-
ployment rate remained below the EU average
(8.9 per cent). As such a fast rise in the rate of
unemployment has been unprecedented since the
early 1990s, we feel that special attention must be
paid to this particular stage of labour market
developments.
Based on the Labour Force Survey
35
, the following
brief analysis examines the composition of the
2004 increase in unemployment by sex, age, edu-
cation, sector and region. To sum up our conclu-
sions, it can be established that the 2004 rise in
unemployment cannot be considered as an age-
specific phenomenon. The rate of unemployment
increased in nearly every age group. Higher
unemployment hit people with secondary and ter-
tiary education harder than others. A considerable
part of the unemployed were already active in the
labour market (i.e. were laid off), but the number of
new entrants (school leavers) also rose quickly. In
terms of sectors, market services and manufactur-
ing laid off staff in the largest numbers, while the
public sector and agriculture contributed to unem-
ployment only to a moderate extent.
In our assumption, the primary reason for this ra-
pid rise in the rate of unemployment lies in falling
labour demand, although labour supply factors
(the influx of graduates into the labour market, the
dissolution of regular military troops, raising the
pensionable age and the appearance of foreign
employment service agencies) have also con-
tributed. In many respects, the 2004 rise in unem-
ployment is similar to that which occurred in 2002,
although the idiosyncratic effects (e.g. staff cuts in
the public sector and decline in the consumption
boom) may trigger a larger and more persistent
increase than earlier.
4. 5. 1 Composition of unemployment
growth
According to the data published in the Labour
Force Survey, the number of unemployed
increased by nearly 30,000 in the course of 2004.
36
First, let us examine the additional numbers of
unemployed in a breakdown by age, qualifications
and sectors.
Age: The increase in unemployment in 2004 result-
ed primarily from rises in two age groups: those
between 20-24 and 50-54. With the exception of
people between 40-44 and 60-64, however, unem-
ployment grew in every age group. Although due to
their relatively small significance in the unemployed
group, the age group of the youngest employees
between 15-19 contributed to the increase in an
average extent, with the rate of unemployment ris-
ing by nearly 30 per cent in this age group.
4. 5 Factors that may explain the recent rise in 
unemployment
35
The Labour Force Survey includes data provided by households by filling out questionnaires. The Labour Force Survey uses the categories set
up by the ILO. Thus, a person is considered unemployed if he or she (1) does not have a paid job in the week reviewed; (2) has been looking for
a job in the immediately preceding four weeks; and (3) would be ready to start a job within the immediately following two weeks.
36
In the course of the analysis, the 2004 changes in the rate of unemployment are interpreted as changes that took place between December 2003
and December 2004. A detailed analysis is performed on the basis of absolute shifts (measure in thousand persons). The reason for this is that this
way the individual groups’ contribution to the aggregated growth is directly quantifiable. Absolute numbers are, however, biased by demographic
effects, which may be handled by an analysis of the unemployment rates within the group. As the results of the analysis of the unemployment rate
do not significantly differ from the picture suggested by absolute values, only the latter are examined in this study.
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Qualifications: The most significant contribution to
unemployment growth came from workers with
secondary education. Unemployment rose similar-
ly in groups with vocational and grammar school
qualification. However, the most rapid increase
was seen among people with tertiary education: in
this group, the number of unemployed with univer-
sity diplomas doubled in the course of 2004.
Reasons for becoming unemployed: In an analysis
of the increase in unemployment according to the
reason for becoming unemployed, nearly 20,000
people were found to have lost their jobs, while
fresh graduates added ‘only’ 10,000 to the number
of unemployed. In other words, among the newly
unemployed there were twice as many previously
employed people as new labour market entrants
fresh out of school. It is worth mentioning, howev-
er, that the number of people who became unem-
ployed on account of graduation rose by a signifi-
cant 50 per cent over the course of 2004.
Sector-classification of last job: In an analysis of
former employees according to the sector classifi-
cation of their last jobs, the largest increase is
seen in the field of market services. In the second
place, people dismissed from manufacturing had
a major contribution to rise in unemployment, while
the public sector and agriculture reduced staffs
only moderately.
An analysis of employment developments may
add interesting information to the sector analysis.
In market services unemployment rose simultane-
ously with an increase in employment. We assume
that the underlying reasons for these develop-
ments are to be found in a reallocation of jobs
within retail, real property business and business
services. In manufacturing, the number of unem-
ployed rose while the rate of employment
declined. A more meticulous sector analysis, how-
ever, clouds the picture. A very small number of
people were put on the redundancy list in the
largest staff cutting sectors, the textile and food
industry. This may have two reasons: dismissed
employees have either become inactive or have
found employment in other sectors. Within manu-
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facturing, people were laid off in the largest num-
bers from the wood processing industry, machin-
ery and equipment manufacturing. However,
machinery and equipment manufacturing is neither
unequivocally staff increasing nor staff reducing.
37
Along with the textile industry, the public sector
also added little to the rise in unemployment,
despite the fact that 2004 saw significant work-
force reductions in the sector. This phenomenon
required further study.
4. 5. 2 Increasing labour supply versus
declining labour demand
In our assumption, the 2004 rise in unemployment
was primarily due to a gradual decline in labour
demand. The signs of decreasing labour demand
are analysed in detail in Section 2.2 of this Report.
The rise in labour demand came to a halt in the pri-
vate sector, while the total hours worked and the
numbers employed remained unchanged, and the
number of vacancies fell in the past six months. In
the wake of staff reductions in the public sector,
employment further declined at the aggregate
level of the economy. The fact that job loss pre-
vails as a reason for unemployment also suggests
a decline in labour demand.
However, it is also possible that rising unemploy-
ment is due to idiosyncratic factors in labour sup-
ply (such as the influx of school leavers into the
labour market, the dissolution of regular military
troops, raising the pensionable age and the
appearance of foreign employment service agen-
cies). These factors can be outlined as follows.
New labour market entrants: As discussed above,
although unemployment rose quickly in the 15-24
age group and among graduates, other age groups
Chart 4.10
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According to the data revealed in the Labour Force Survey, headcount in machinery and equipment manufacturing dropped by 9,000 in the
course of 2004, while the institutional labour statistics indicates increase by 6,000 people.
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added roughly equal numbers to unemployment,
and job loss was the most significant reason of all
for the massive rise in unemployment. Moreover,
the available data are insufficient to clarify if the rea-
son for the rise in unemployment amongst fresh
entrants lies in a stronger outflow from schools
(increasing labour supply) or a decline in employ-
ment (decreasing labour demand).
38
Rise in the pensionable age: Theoretically, the
government decree raising the pensionable age
limits the number of people leaving the labour
market in even years, which may have increased
labour supply and consequently pushed up unem-
ployment in 2004. However, as discussed in the
February 2005 issue of the Report, no such
change can be shown in the number of applicants
for old-age pension. This means that rise in the
pensionable age probably affected unemploy-
ment in a similar way as in previous years.
Dissolution of regular troops: this affected approx-
imately 3,000 people in 2004, and thus its impact
was insignificant.
Foreign employment service agencies
39
: A sudden
increase in unemployment in border counties pro-
vides indirect evidence of the impact of employ-
ment service agencies, and the facts actually sub-
stantiate this. However, the largest increase in
unemployment was not recorded in the counties
where this service is typically provided.
All things considered, we believe that although the
aforementioned labour supply developments have
also contributed to the 2004 rise in unemployment,
none of them can be designated as the main rea-
son for unemployment. In our opinion, the primary
reason for a rise in unemployment was decrease
in labour demand.
4. 5. 3 Is the recent rise in unemploy-
ment a novel situation? A comparison
with developments in 2002.
In terms of future wage inflation pressure, one
important aspect is whether over the long term
unemployment will remain high relative to its earli-
er level (see Section 3). The available information
provides insufficient points of reference to decide
definitively if the rapid rise in unemployment is a
transient or permanent phenomenon, as in the
recent past, the rate of unemployment rose only
once, namely in 2002.
The 2002 rise in unemployment was due to exter-
nal cyclical reasons (as 2002 was marked most
strongly by the global recession). As soon as
recovery started, unemployment dropped nearly
to its earlier measured low rates. This means that
the increase in unemployment was temporary.
With a view to this fact, it is worth comparing the
current rise in unemployment with the develop-
ments seen in 2002.
In our opinion, the current rise in unemployment
was triggered by a decline in labour demand,
which can be ascribed to cyclical reasons.
40
According to the evidence provided in the above
charts, the composition of the increase is also sim-
ilar to 2002. In both cases, young age groups and
people with secondary education significantly
contributed to rise in unemployment, with unem-
ployment also increasing rapidly among university
graduates. In both cases, most of the unemployed
had lost their jobs, significant numbers of them in
manufacturing. In 2002, unemployment rose
simultaneously with a rise in employment in the
fields of retail, real property business, business
38
International experience indicates that fresh entrants’ employment is extremely sensitive to the cyclical fluctuations in labour demand.
39
Foreign employment service agencies may contribute to the rise in unemployment in two ways. Directly, if the foreign labour they employ crowd
out domestic employees from the labour market. Indirectly, if domestic labour is employed through agencies, and statistics are unable to capture
this movement. As the Labour Force Statistics takes the latter effect into consideration, rises in unemployment may be related to employment ser-
vice agencies only in the former way.
40
Chart 2.21 in the main text reveals that unemployment increased in manufacturing in a manner similar to that seen 2002.
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services and machinery and equipment manufac-
turing. This suggests that in the past, job realloca-
tion, which in international experience entails per-
manent unemployment, had a transient effect.
Overall, the current rise in unemployment may be
traced back to similar reasons and is composed of
similar constituents as two years earlier, and thus
it might be considered as transient.
However, in our opinion, there are several factors
impeding a rapid decrease in unemployment.
Other economic sectors are currently less capable
of absorbing released labour than they were in
2002. In market services in 2004 the number of
unemployed rose nearly three times as fast as in
2002, which may be related to a decline in domes-
tic demand for such services. In addition, the pub-
lic sector absorbed 40,000 people in 2002, and
released 20,000 in 2004.
41
We project that in the
next few years the public sector will further reduce
its staff, and thus contribute to the rise in unem-
ployment over the longer term.
According to the theory of unemployment persist-
ence, the longer a person remains without a job
the lower the chance of finding a job is, primarily
as the knowledge and experience gained in previ-
ous jobs becomes obsolete. As the current
increase in unemployment exceeds the 2002 rise
both in terms of in time and extent, this impact
suggests the evolution of a far more persistent
unemployment.
41
The Labour Force Survey is in a slight conflict with our assumption of government behaviour, as it indicates 4,000 people released from the pub-
lic sector 2002 and no contribution by the sector to the rise in unemployment. In our opinion, the public sector’s overall impact on employment might
have been positive in 2002 and negative in 2004.
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4. 6 Stylised facts in consumer price statistics: durable
goods
Within the framework of this series, price develop-
ments are scrutinised in individual groups of prod-
ucts or services. The February 2005 Report gave
details of telephony, while this issue focuses on
durable goods. First, the peculiar features of
durable goods are described and the problems
the statistical office faces during the measurement
of changes in the relevant durable prices are out-
lined. Following this, developments in the prices of
durable goods and the complete consumer bas-
ket are compared. As a first step in the interna-
tional comparison, the weight of this product cate-
gory is assessed in new versus old EU Member
States, and finally, the correlation between the
level of economic development and the relative
price level of durable goods is examined.
4. 6. 1 Peculiar features of durable
goods
In the MNB’s system used for the purposes of analy-
sis, tradables are products that are imported or com-
pete with imported goods.
42
In the MNB’s classifica-
tion, tradables are divided into durables and non-
durables. There is no clear dividing line in every case,
for instance, in the Eurostat’s classification a third
group called semi-durables is also distinguished. In
our opinion, a product can be considered as a
durable good if it has the following features:
• It is consumed slowly;
• It represents high value, and some durables can
even be considered as an investment;
• It has a secondary market; and
• It has an extremely small part not involved in
international competition.
The MNB classifies the following sub-groups of the
CSO among durables:
• Durable household goods: furniture (0.7 per
cent) and heating and cooking equipment (0.7 per
cent) representing the most significant share.
• Motor vehicles: new passenger cars (3.2 per
cent). 
• Durable entertainment facilities: television sets
(0.5 per cent).
Currently, altogether durable goods account for
8.4 per cent of the entire consumer basket.
In some cases, the classification of a product on
the basis of the above considerations is contro-
versial. For instance, the item identified as ‘holiday
abroad’ is classified among tradable goods in the
MNB’s system, because exchange rates and im-
port prices play an important role in the develop-
ment of their prices. Furthermore, with a view to
the high value of the product, it could also be clas-
sified among durable goods, however, it is includ-
ed among non-durables because it is consumed
quickly.
Based on durability and secondary market, certain
higher-value clothing items could also be classi-
fied among durables, however, textile and leather
products may have a relatively significant compo-
nent that does not face competition from imported
products.
As a point of interest, let us mention the fact that in
practice both the CSO and the Eurostat include
used cars in the consumer basket. This is in con-
flict with the principle laid down in the national
accounts statistics stipulating that every product
can be recorded only once. Used cars comprise
an exception primarily on account of their consid-
42
Manual to Hungarian Economic Statistics, MNB 2002, p. 13.
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erable market share. In the system used by the
MNB, this item is classified among durable goods.
4. 6. 2 Issues related to measurement:
changes in quality and the manage-
ment of new goods
If the CPI were an actual indicator of the cost of liv-
ing, it would measure changes in the expenditure
required to reach a specific level of usefulness,
which is not necessarily identical with a particular
consumer basket. By contrast, the baskets used in
both Hungarian and European practice are
weighted with the base period, and thus the sub-
stitution effect does not hold. For this reason, con-
sumer price indices theoretically overestimate
changes in the costs of living.
43
The so-called Boskin report
44
revealed further
sources of bias in the calculation of the US CPI,
and tackled, among others, the inadequate han-
dling of quality changes and new goods in price
statistics. In the case of durables, the above prob-
lems are of special significance, as they rapidly
change and have short life-cycles. This is because
statistical price changes may imply quality
changes, and disregard for this fact biases esti-
mates on the cost of living. Changes in the prices
of newly introduced products are also difficult to
detect, as they have no ‘past’ to form a basis of
comparison.
The Central Statistical Office adjusts each sin-
gle durable good for quality. However, ‘in the
event of change in the price of a product or ser-
vice, it is difficult to define the extent of the actu-
al price change as against the change justified
by the modified product quality’.
45
For example,
if both the price and the performance of a car
change, the role of quality change in the price
change can only be estimated. In the recent
years the seasonal adjustment techniques of the
Central Statistical Office have significantly
improved.
A further source of bias is implied in the fact that
in compliance with the Eurostat requirements, the
CSO applies the weights measured in household
statistics two years before the specific year
reviewed in the relevant statistics. This is espe-
cially problematic in the case of durable goods, as
their importance within consumption is constant
increasing, which is, however, reflected in the con-
sumer price statistics with a two-year delay.
Another problem involved in this issue is the sep-
aration of the prices of certain durable goods from
their related services. Currently, mobile tele-
phones are not included in the Hungarian CPI, as
they are presumably purchased together with sub-
scription or pre-paid cards.
4. 6. 3 Changes in durable prices in
the past decade and the major factors
affecting prices
International competition characteristically limits
rise in the prices of tradables. With a view to the
fact that the ratio of durables which is not in com-
petition with imported goods is quite small, this
impact is especially strong. In the wake of rapid
technological development, increased productivi-
ty has further limited price rises in this product cat-
egory. While average inflation grew by 210 per
cent between December 1994 and February 2005,
tradable prices rose by 122 per cent, and durable
prices by a mere 69 per cent during the same
period.
43
A detailed discussion of this issue is given in: Ferenczi, Barnabás –Valkovszky, Sándor – Vincze, János : What are Consumer Price Statistics Good
for? MNB Working Papers, 2000/5
44
Gordon, Robert – James, National: The Boskin Commission Report and its aftermath, NBER Working Paper Series (No. 7759)
45
Central Statistical Office: The Statistical Method of CPI calculation, Budapest, 2000, p.26.
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Due to sharp international competition, it is rea-
sonable to assume that, in forint terms, changes in
the prices applied by Hungary’s most important
foreign trade partners provide a fair approximation
to changes in durable prices. This indicator is
called imported inflation.
46
Under a crawling peg
regime, the imported and actual rates of inflation
are expected to move more in alignment because
the exchange rate path is predictable. In this
study, price changes in the euro area, Hungary’s
most important partner, are considered as a basis
for comparison. As over the entire period
reviewed, durable price movements did not
exceed 2 per cent, imported inflation resulted for
the most part from exchange rate fluctuations. This
assumption is substantiated in our chart. It is clear
that in highly volatile periods, for instance during
the Russian crisis, prices adjusted to exchange
rate changes with some delay and presumably in
a smoothed manner, and following the 2001
widening of the intervention band, co-movement
between the two time series loosened.
4. 6. 4 International comparison
Weights
It is highly probable that a country’s level of devel-
opment determines the significance of durable
goods within the consumer basket. In relatively
less developed countries a larger proportion of the
income is spent on ‘subsistence goods’, primarily
food. Several durable goods, including the most
significant one, i.e. cars, are purchased only if
higher income is realised. Although durables are
frequently purchased from loans, a precondition
for borrowing is high income. The development of
financial intermediation also affects the volume of
durables purchased with loans. Based on the
classification applied by Eurostat (coicop), for
instance, in 2005 cars weigh
47
3.1 per cent in Hun-
gary, and 4.9 per cent in the EU-15 on average.
Durable weights plotted against per capita GDP
reveals that this correlation can be shown only up to
a specific level of development. In the case of old
EU Member States, indicated by blue points, per
capita GDP no longer affects the weight of durables.
46
Imported inflation is calculated by multiplying of the price index for durable goods with the EUR/HUF exchange rate change.
47
This slightly differs from the weights used in the Hungarian price statistics.
Chart 4.12
Comparison of the Hungarian CPI with the prices of
tradables and durables
(December 1994 = 100)
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Chart 4.13
Average of the 2000 price indices for durables and
imported durables
(Average of 2000=100)
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Price developments
In the New Cronos database of Eurostat, the data
relevant to all EU countries are available only from
2001. Over a period of this length, no region-spe-
cific data can be obtained, and thus no more than
the most essential data are disclosed.
Taking December 2000 as a basis, durable
prices fell to the greatest extent in 5 new
Member States. The largest price reduction was
seen in Cyprus. In the EU-25, prices declined by
1.6 per cent on average. Within the Central
European region, prices fell by 12.1 per cent in
the Czech Republic, 3.7 per cent in Hungary and
1.2 per cent in Poland, while the largest price
hike of the EU-25 was also registered in the reg-
ion, namely in Slovenia. Opposite price move-
ments are registered in the two accession coun-
tries. Prices fell more than average in this group
of information processors
48
, which is of minor
account but still important on the basis of its role
in the economy.
Relative price level
This analysis relies on the comparative price levels
published by Eurostat. Expressed in the common
currency, statistics indicate the average prices of
the individual product and service categories in
the individual member states.
49
If the final consumption expenditure of households
is considered as a consumer basket, a close con-
nection can be shown between the countries’ rel-
ative development and relative price levels. There
are also other factors to significantly affect durable
price levels. In our opinion, the most important
ones are market size and the intensity of competi-
tion. With the exception of Italy, the relative price
levels of the largest old economies of the EU
remain below the average of the European Union.
The relative development measured on the basis
of per capita GDP is shown, as an explanatory
variable, on axis x of the cloud depicted in our
chart  while the relative price levels of the com-
plete consumer basket and of tradable goods are
plotted on axis y as dependent variables. The rela-
Chart 4.14
Per capita GDP and the weight of durables in the con-
sumer basket 
(New Member States and Accession Countries are marked
in red, the red diamond stands for Hungary. 2003 data.)
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Chart 4.15
Correlation between per capita GDP and relative price
levels in 2003
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Full English name: Audio-visual, photographic and information processing equipment.
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In the ESA95 classification: average of the EU25=100.
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tionship between development and the relative
price level is obviously weaker in the case of
durable goods.
This analysis shed light upon the fact that as
durables are the goods most exposed to interna-
tional competition, exchange rates are the primary
factor to affect developments in their prices. Due pri-
marily to lower incomes, in less developed EU
Member States durables are insignificant in the con-
sumer basket. In addition to the level of develop-
ment, factors such as market size and the intensity
of competition also have a considerable impact.
91
From 2004 H2 major disinflation has been seen in
consumer prices. Disinflation is clearly reflected in
nearly every constituent of the CPI, and more
specifically, the most recent data reveal decline in
the prices of tradables, food products and alco-
holic beverages. While earlier deflation was char-
acteristically recorded only in the prices of
unprocessed food products, which are highly
volatile, from early 2005 it is also seen in the case
of processed food products, amounting to 12 per
cent of the consumer basket.
Disinflation in food prices may have resulted from
the combined effects of several factors. One of the
possible reasons may be a strengthening in the
EUR/HUF exchange rate in early 2004. A stronger
exchange rate directly triggers disinflation, as on
relative terms imports of agricultural and
processed food products become cheaper. In
2004, agricultural output, which was exceptionally
good in the region, and the historically low growth
rate of domestic household consumption gave fur-
ther impetus to disinflation, as their coincidence
may have resulted in oversupply in the market of
food products.
In addition to the above reasons, further explana-
tions may include accession to the European
Union and the impacts of accession to the single
market on domestic prices. The reason for this is
that cross-border trade in other products had
practically been liberalised by the time of acces-
sion, whereas in trade relationships with both the
EU-15 and the ten accession countries the import
of agricultural and certain food products was still
limited by customs tariffs and quotas and their ex-
port was subsidised. When import restrictions
were lifted, the Hungarian market was opened to
cheaper foreign products and the range of
domestic products could be widened. Directly
(through lower import prices) or indirectly (through
intensifying competition), these factors also
prompted disinflation.
50
The possible disinflationary/deflationary impacts
of EU accession are substantiated in a
Background Study prepared by the MNB on the
expected effects of EU accession on food prices.
51
Based on a comparative analysis of the agricultur-
al and food prices in the EU-15 and Hungary, the
study points out that certain domestic agricultural
producer prices actually closely approached or
even exceeded the European Union’s average
producer prices in 1999-2000, and concludes that
no sudden and significant rise is to be expected in
consumer food prices following accession.
The above-specified likely impact of EU accession
can be detected in foreign trade developments. At
4. 7 Short-term effects of accession to the EU 
– food products
Chart 4.16
Consumer prices of processed and unprocessed food
products
(Seasonally adjusted annualised quarterly changes)
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Theoretically, competition may also have been augmented by factors independent of accession to the EU, e.g. the appearance of certain new
retail companies in the domestic market.
51
See Ferenczi – Jakab – Nagy: Is there an inflation tension in Hungarian food prices? In: The expected effects of Hungary’s accession to the EU.
MNB Background studies. (available only in Hungarian language)
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around the date of accession and subsequently,
the volume of imported food, beverages and
tobacco increased at an accelerating pace. In
2004 H2, import volumes were up more than 30
per cent on a year earlier.
52
Simultaneously, import
prices fell (in forint as well as in euro terms),
although only slightly. The observed develop-
ments are in line with the hypothesis that following
accession to the EU, large volumes of relatively
cheap goods flowed into Hungary.
Accession to the single European market and the
adoption of the European tariff system required
the rearrangement of the national structure of tra-
de in food. Foreign trade integration strengthened
within the European Union, and this diverted trade
relations from countries outside the European
Union. Interestingly, rearrangement in food, bever-
ages and tobacco imports started as early as
2003, and gained further impetus after EU acces-
sion. However, based on data available at current
prices, this rearrangement is less obvious in the
national structure of food, beverages and tobacco
exports, and is of the opposite direction in the tra-
de of all goods. The latter phenomenon is in keep-
ing with the facts that the import of non-food prod-
ucts from the EU-25 had not been restricted prior
to EU accession, and similarly to the international
developments, in recent years the expansion of
imports from the Far East prevailed in the national
structure of total imports.
Most groups of food products clearly reveal accel-
erating (sometimes even conspicuous) increases
in imports from the EU-25. In most food products
with large trade turnover, the 2004 growth in
imports significantly exceeded the average of im-
port growths in the previous four years (2000-
2003). Simultaneously, the relatively high level of
Hungarian production costs and prices in com-
parison to other participants in the European mar-
ket may be reflected in the fact that the country’s
net export position vis-à-vis the EU-25 deteriorat-
ed in nearly every group of food products. In addi-
tion to a regional intensification of trade in food,
expansion in the export of food, beverages and
tobacco from Hungary characteristically fell short
of imports of such.
In terms of the effects on consumer prices, the pic-
Chart 4.17
Volumes and prices of imported food, beverages and
tobacco
(Seasonally adjusted; average of 2000=1; EUR-based price
index)
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Chart 4.18
Import turnover in food, beverages and tobacco in a
breakdown of country groups
(At current prices; EUR millions)
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Although immediately before the EU accession, imports suddenly increased fast while customs tariffs and quotas were still applied, this may well
have been part of the importers’ market acquisition strategy.
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ture is far more complex, as not every product that
underwent major import growth resulted in significant
disinflation in the corresponding consumer price sta-
tistics. Thus, for instance, while the import of live-
stock from the EU-25 grew nearly six fold on a year
earlier, on the basis of market information, it can be
considered as a replacement for declining domestic
production and did not cause change in either raw or
processed meat prices. Similarly, increase in the im-
port of goods may be linked with the shut-down of a
domestic tobacco manufacturer.
Major changes in consumer prices – most proba-
bly due to the underlying impacts of cheap import
goods that pin down prices – are seen in two prod-
uct categories of consumer price statistics. These
include milk and dairy products and alcoholic bev-
erages. In both cases the rate of price hikes
slowed down in comparison to the previous years,
and in early 2005 it turned into deflation.
53
Table 4.13
Trade in certain food products with the EU-25*
(At current prices; EUR millions)
Weight within the Growth rate of imports Net export position
group “Food, (percentage) (EUR millions)
With the EU-25 beverages and 
tobacco” (based
on 2004 turnover, Average of Average of
percentage) 2000-2003 2004 2000-2003 2004
Livestock 4.8 16.2 492.0 60.0 9.6
Meat and meat products 7.8 53.0 98.5 408.9 346.8
Dairy products and eggs 5.4 25.6 24.9 -16.8 -48.6
Cereals and grain products 10.3 23.6 49.8 124.5 118.8
Vegetables and fruit 17.4 39.9 -1.5 226.5 214.8
Sugar. sugar products and honey 3.4 18.5 32.6 22.2 49.2
Coffee. tea. cocoa and spices 11.5 19.1 36.7 -26.7 -74.4
Beverages 7.1 29.9 68.7 33.0 -42.0
Tobacco and tobacco products 3.3 17.4 110.9 -6.5 -31.0
* The above major product categories give over 70 per cent of the total amount of products falling under ‘food, beverages and tobacco’.
53
In the case of milk and dairy products, prices dropped at the beginning of 2004. This can be explained by the fact that in this product category
imports from the EU15 had gathered speed already prior to the EU accession, from late 2003.
Chart 4.19
Consumer prices of milk, dairy products and alcoholic
beverages
(Annualised monthly growth rate of trend)
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(Since May 2004, the seasonally adjusted con-
sumer prices of milk and dairy products, which
amount to 3.2 per cent of the consumer basket,
have dropped by 2-3 per cent. Ferenczi et al.
(2001) have already called the attention to the fact
that domestic producer prices barely fall short of
the average producer prices of the three largest
European milk producing countries (Germany,
France and the Netherlands). Prior to accession,
in some new  Member States prices were proba-
bly significantly lower than in Hungary.
54
Thus it
was to be expected that through the appearance
of lower foreign prices, the enlargement of the
European Union would have a disinflationary
impact in Hungary. Accordingly, 2003-2004 saw
the value of imported dairy products increase by
over 20 per cent once again. And the EU-15 and
the New Member States increased their share to
gain predominance in the national structure. 
Within the category of alcoholic beverages,
amounting to 6.4 per cent of the consumer basket,
the price of beer fell in the largest measure, how-
ever, deflation could also be seen in other alco-
holic product prices. This phenomenon is also
explained by the cheap goods imported from the
EU-15 and the New Member States. Based on
anecdotal information, however, EU accession is
not the only underlying factor to explain all these,
other factors have also contributed to the appear-
ance of cheap goods. Thus, for instance, the im-
port of large volumes of canned beer from
Germany may be explained by the fact that modi-
fications in the German market regulation (the
introduction of product fees) prompted partici-
pants to direct their sales towards other markets.
The above-described phenomena observed in the
prices of and trade in agricultural and food prod-
ucts typically follow from trade integration. The
effects that unfolded in 2004, including the
strengthening of trade relations and price levelling
within the European Union, as well as the diversion
of trade from non-EU countries, are considered to
54
This is supported by the fact that subsequently to the EU accession, in Poland dairy prices rose extremely fast, output and production capacities
expanded, while the value of exports increased by nearly 85 per cent on a year earlier. Source: ‘Poland: Dairy and Products’, Global Agriculture
Information Network (GAIN) Report, November 2004 (http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200410/146117610.pdf). Similarly, in the Czech Republic
and Slovakia, producer milk and butter prices, respectively, rose at a rate above average, which resulted from the increased export possibilities.
Source: CNB Report on Inflation, January 2005, and ‘First Experiences of the Slovak Agriculture Following EU Accession’, report by the state sec-
retary of the Slovakian Ministry of Agriculture, 28 January 2005.
Chart 4.20
Import turnover in dairy products and egg, in a break-
down of country groups
(At current prices; EUR millions)
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Chart 4.21
Import turnover of beverages, in a breakdown of coun-
try groups
(At current prices; EUR millions)
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be short-term outcomes of integration.
55
With
regard to domestic consumer prices, levelling
involves a single change in prices, affecting the
rate of inflation merely as a transient effect, and
remains within the confines of price levelling.
However, price levelling is unlikely to have finished,
thus the above-specified disinflationary/deflating
impacts will be felt throughout the year of 2005.
55
Regarding the effects of European trade integration, see e.g. Andre Sapir (1992), Regional Integration in Europe, The Economic Journal, Vol. 102,
No. 415.
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4. 8 Economic fluctuations in Central and Eastern Europe
In the post-socialist countries of Central and
Eastern Europe, the mere existence of business
cycles was a novelty for most citizens, observers
and policymakers. Although spontaneous eco-
nomic fluctuations intermingle with the recession
resulting from economic transition and the subse-
quent recovery, it has become clear that despite
robust improvement in profitability, growth
remains uneven in these economies.
In a study recently published by the MNB
56
, we
endeavour to describe these fluctuations from the
volatility, persistence and co-movements of vari-
ous macroeconomic indicators.
The chart plots fluctuations in the Hungarian econ-
omy. Despite the short sample period, it is clear
that growth in GDP and, even more, industrial out-
put were far from being even. Examples include
the 1995 overheating, the prolonged effects of the
subsequent adjustment, the upturn that started in
around 1998 (interrupted by the Russian crisis),
and finally slowdown around 2001. However, the
chart cannot display the manner in which total out-
put and the diverse other indicators move togeth-
er in the course of the individual fluctuations.
Overall, it may be said that in the countries of the
CEE region economic fluctuations exceed those
measured in developed economies, and in size
they are similar to those observed in emerging
markets. This especially holds to private con-
sumption: citizens in transition countries spend
much when they have high incomes and consid-
erably cut their expenditures when their income is
low. Co-movements between variables, however,
show a high degree of similarity. An important
exception is government consumption, which is
characteristically pro-cyclical, in contrast with
developed countries. This may suggest that the
governments of the region make only restricted
use of fiscal policies in smoothing economic fluc-
tuations. 
Fluctuation size – an international comparison
The following table shows volatility and auto-corre-
lation in the cyclical component of output.
57
It is
clear that fluctuations are larger in transition
economies than in developed ones, however, per-
sistence (auto-correlation) in fluctuations is very
similar. Characteristically, the first two auto-corre-
lations are significantly positive, while the third one
is marginally significant. 
However, it is important to see that the volatility
indicators of developed countries differ consider-
ably in the earlier and later periods of the sample.
In the 1990s, economic activity was far more bal-
anced than earlier. For this reason, the indicators
of transition economies should rather be com-
pared with the early period.
Cyclical features in Central and Eastern European
Countries, CEECs
Our major findings are the following:
• Consumption is highly volatile;
• Government expenditures are pro-cyclical;
• Investment is extremely volatile;
• Net exports are counter-cyclical;
• Imports are far more pro-cyclical than exports;
56
Péter Benczúr - Attila Rátfai: Economic Fluctuations in Central and Eastern Europe - The Facts, MNB Working Papers 2005/2.
57
A cyclical component is the deviation of the individual variables (in this case real GDP and industrial output) from the trend. Trend can be inter-
preted in several ways. The results included in this study result from the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
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• Exports are most pro-cyclical and persistent in
open economies;
• Labour market variables are highly volatile;
• Employment follows output with delay, and is
frequently pro-cyclical;
• Real wages are for the most part pro-cyclical;
• Productivity is typically pro-cyclical and coinci-
dental;
• Private sector credit is pro-cyclical and charac-
teristically delayed;
• Consumer prices are counter-cyclical and char-
acteristically delayed;
• The cyclical nature of inflation is not beyond
doubt, its volatility relative to output is low;
• Net capital flows characteristically lead the
cycle, are pro-cyclical and have low persistence;
• Nominal interest rates are characteristically
smooth and persistent;
• Nominal exchange rates are more persistent
than real exchange rates.
Our analysis reveals that the features of fluctuation
are similar in Croatia, the new EU Member States
and developed countries. The largest differences
are disclosed in the case of Bulgaria, Romania
and Russia, especially in terms of the labour mar-
ket, price and exchange rate variables. With
regard to the other countries, the indicators of
cyclicality give a highly homogeneous picture in
many cases.
Chart 4.22
Cyclical components of Hungarian GDP and industrial
output
—0.06
—0.04
—0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
—0.06
—0.04
—0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
Industrial production 
(cyclical component)
GDP 
(cyclical component)
93
 Q
1
93
 Q
4
94
 Q
3
95
 Q
2
96
 Q
1
96
 Q
4
97
 Q
3
98
 Q
3
99
 Q
1
99
 Q
4
00
 Q
3
01
 Q
2
02
 Q
1
01
 Q
4
03
 Q
3
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
98
Table 4.14
Fluctuations in an international comparison
GDP (real)
Group Period Volatility Autocorrelation
1. 2. 3. 4.
Developing 1978-1995 3.10 -- -- -- --
1993-2002 2.89 0.74 0.48 0.18 -0.11
CEECs 1993-2002 2.29 0.63 0.42 0.23 0.1
New member states 1993-2002 1.77 0.57 0.39 0.21 0.08
Hungary 1993-2002 1.06 0.67 0.32 0.03 0.13
G7 1960-1989 1.50 0.74 0.52 0.30 0.11
1993-2002 0.82 0.75 0.54 0.27 -0.02
EU 1960-1989 2.12 0.52 0.31 0.18 0.06
1993-2002 1.06 0.68 0.48 0.25 0.02
Industrial output (real)
Group Period Volatility Autocorrelation
1. 2. 3. 4.
Developing 1978-1995 4.15 0.55 0.34 0.13 -0.08
1993-2002 3.91 0.59 0.36 0.13 -0.12
CEEC 1993-2002 4.18 0.67 0.41 0.20 -0.06
New member states 1993-2002 3.44 0.65 0.39 0.14 -0.13
Hungary 1993-2002 3.93 0.87 0.68 0.41 0.13
G7 1960-1989 3.39 -- -- -- --
1993-2002 1.94 0.79 0.50 0.18 -0.15
EU 1960-1989 3.07 -- -- -- --
1993-2002 2.34 0.63 0.36 0.12 -0.18
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In 2004, Hungary concluded (and then amended)
an agreement with Sweden for the ten-year lease
and purchase of 14 fighter aircraft. Pursuant to this
agreement, the Hungarian state will obtain owner-
ship of the fighters in 2016, following an uninter-
rupted payment of HUF 15 billion per year as a
rental. Despite this fact, the fighters will arrive in
Hungary during 2006 and 2007.
As the GDP statistics, the balance of trade on the
current account and the ESA deficit of general
government use an accrual-based methodology,
they will settle accounts with the total expenditure
related to the aircraft upon their physical delivery.
Consequently, while in the cash-based (GFS) fiscal
statistics additional expenditures will be recorded
in even distribution between 2002 and 2016, the
total amount of expenditure will appear all at once
in the 2006-2007 deficit of the external equilibrium
and the ESA-based deficit of the budget. Thus,
irrespective of the fundamental developments, in
this period the indicators of macroeconomic stabil-
ity will be unfavourably biased.
A similar accounting methodology was followed in
1993, when in the framework of the financial set-
tlement of earlier Russian debts to Hungary, the
Russian party paid part of them by the supply of
28 MIG-29 service aircraft. This supply worth USD
800 million raised the value of 1993 imports, gov-
ernment consumption and the current account de-
ficit on a one-off basis.
The fighters expected to arrive in Hungary in 2006
represent HUF 90 billion, in other words, as a
result of the one-off effect of the delivery of these
fighters, the ESA-based government deficit, used
as an indicator in the convergence programme,
will increase by 0.4 per cent of GDP.
Imports and government consumption measured
in GDP will also increase in a similar extent, which,
assuming an unchanged GDP growth rate, will
raise domestic consumption and result in higher
deficit in the net GDP-based exports.
In the current account the customs-based trade in
goods will increase by approximately EUR 360
million, i.e. the current account deficit and the
external borrowing will be 0.4 per cent of GDP
higher than the ‘value following from fundamental
developments’. In 2007, delivery will represent
approximately HUF 110 billion, thus the one-off
deficit increasing effect may be 0.45 per cent of
GDP.
As, irrespective of fundamental developments, the
above calculations suggest a one-off deficit rise in
the equilibrium indicators projected in this Report,
they are disregarded in the projections. However,
in contrast with the cash-based GFS-deficit, where
this expenditure is recorded in line with rental pay-
ment in an even distribution for 14 years continu-
ously, in the SNA-based borrowing requirement of
the government sector, this expenditure will be
recorded for 2006-2007. 
4. 9 Effects of the Gripen Agreement on 2006–2007
macroeconomic data
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* Recurring analyses are not listed here.
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